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ABSTRACT

This study reports on one of the knowledge development activities conducted under the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 (YEDPA). The report contains findings of an analysis of nine YEDPA projects and the factors that contributed to effective implementation of these programs. The study compares discrete projects with different goals and objectives and identifies the successful implementation measures. The following common features of successfully implemented programs were found: (1) programs were conceptualized and designed as well as administered by local personnel; (2) all participating institutions cooperated because each benefits from the program; (3) potential pitfalls are thought through in advance so that responses are available rapidly; (4) projects are built on ideas that have already been tested locally and delivered by institutions of demonstrated effectiveness; (5) feedback and evaluation are built in from the beginning and results are used; each project has a problem solver; (6) persons with significant contacts in two or more institutional arenas required for program success are involved in key ways; (7) the projects tend to consider all elements necessary to make the activity succeed, especially emphasizing job placement from the outset. It was recommended that these success factors be taken into account when planning for the implementation of other YEDPA projects. (Detailed case studies of the nine programs are included in the report.) (KC)

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YOUTH KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT REPORT

IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
Improving the Implementation of YEDPA Programs

ED206871

May 1980

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YOUTH KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT REPORT 8.6

IMPROVING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF YEDPA PROGRAMS

Center for Public Service
Brandeis University

May 1980

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OVERVIEW

Research, evaluation and demonstration activity is usually directed to problem identification and analysis, determination of what works and for whom, and testing of model program designs. Much less attention is paid to implementation issues--the "how-to-do-it" questions such as the ways designs need to be adapted to local conditions, how key players can be involved and their interest maintained, how linkages can be achieved with other institutions, how problems can be detected and corrected, how conflict can be resolved, how the learning curves and stabilization period can be compressed.

These research and development priorities are the reverse of what probably makes the most sense operationally and what would have the greatest impact. Even the most innovative program approach can flounder on implementation issues, while the most pedestrian approach may have positive impacts if properly operated. Until basic activities are operated effectively, it may be counterproductive to pursue more sophisticated designs. As a generalization, the margin for improvement in employment and training activities is overwhelming concentrated in the implementation arena. With no change in program designs--no "model" programs or new approaches--the effectiveness of employment and training activities could be improved substantially with common sense in planning and management, and more consideration of implementation issues. Modifications and program design are not likely to be productive unless the basic implementation tasks are already being handled effectively.

In the "knowledgement development" activities under the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act, there has been a major emphasis on process evaluations linked to impact evaluations in order to determine not only what works (or does not) for whom, but also why. Every major demonstration includes at least one process evaluation and may also be covered by crosscutting studies of replication processes, program "batting averages," learning curves and the like. The Standardized Assessment System for youth demonstrations programs includes a process questionnaire which permits quantification of the key dimensions of local program implementation so that these can be analyzed along with quantitatively measured impacts.

This volume represents another dimension of this effort. One of the integral knowledge development activities has been the identification of "model" programs and elements that have emerged at the local level under the decentralized CETA system. These models include both well-run conventional activities and those that have innovative features. Identification of models includes an effort to identify implementation hints. However, each project can only explain how it achieved success, which may not be the key ingredients in other circumstances. The present analysis, in contrast, compares discrete projects with different goals and objectives and seeks to identify the success ingredients. It finds certain common features:

First, the projects involve all the key local "players" from the outset. Those that conceptualize the projects are closely linked to or are the same persons who subsequently administer the projects.

Second, there is a convergence of interest among the key institutional players; all benefit from cooperation.

Third, the potential pitfalls are thought through in advance so that responses are forthcoming rapidly.

Fourth, the projects are built on ideas that have already been tried locally and are delivered by institutions of demonstrated effectiveness, suggesting the need for an evolutionary rather than revolutionary process of program change.

Fifth, mechanisms for feedback and evaluation are built-in from the outset and the results utilized. Each project has a "fixer" who concentrates on problem resolution.

Sixth, "double agents"--persons with significant contracts in two or more institutional arenas required for program success--involved in key ways.

Seventh, the projects tend to consider all elements necessary to make the activity succeed. In particular, placement iss given emphasis from the outset rather than waiting until participants are far along in the programs.

More detailed implementation findings will emerge from the research, evaluation and demonstration activities now underway, but this review contains important information of use at both the national and local levels.

This review was commissioned as part of the work of the Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment. Its findings were factored into the legislative and administrative recommendations made by the Task Force and subsequently proposed by the Carter Administration.

This study is one of "knowledge development" activities mounted in conjunction with research, evaluation and development activities funded under the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977. The knowledge development effort will result in literally thousands of written products. Each activity has been structured from the outset so that it is self-standing but also interrelated with a host of other activities. The framework is presented in A Knowledge Development Plan for the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977, A Knowledge Development Plan for the Youth Initiatives Fiscal 1979 and Completing the Youth Agenda: A Plan for Knowledge Development, Dissemination and Application for Fiscal 1980.

Information is available or will be coming available from these various knowledge development efforts to help resolve an almost limitless array of issues. However, policy and practical application will usually require integration and synthesis from a wide range of products, which, in turn, depend on knowledge and availability of these products. A major shortcoming of past research, evaluation and demonstration activities has been the failure to organize and disseminate the products adequately to assure the full exploitation of the findings. The magnitude and structure

of the youth knowledge development effort puts a premium on structured analysis and wide dissemination.

As part of its knowledge development mandate, therefore, the Office of Youth Programs of the Department of Labor will organize, publish and disseminate the written products of all major research, evaluation and demonstration activities supported directly by or mounted in conjunction with OYP knowledge development efforts. Some of the same products may also be published and disseminated through other channels, but they will be included in the structured series of Youth Knowledge Development Reports in order to facilitate access and integration.

The Youth Knowledge Development Reports, of which this is one, are divided into twelve broad categories:

1. Knowledge Development Framework: The products in this category are concerned with the structure of knowledge development activities, the assessment methodologies which are employed, the measurement instruments and their validation, the translation of knowledge into policy, and the strategy for dissemination of findings.

2. Research on Youth Employment and Employability Development: The products in this category represent analyses of existing data, presentation of findings from new data sources, special studies of dimensions of youth labor market problems, and policy issue assessments.

3. Program Evaluations: The products in this category include impact, process and benefit-cost evaluations of youth programs including the Summer Youth Employment Program, Job Corps, the Young Adult Conservation Corps, Youth Employment and Training Programs, Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Projects, and the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit.

4. Service and Participant Mix: The evaluations and demonstrations summarized in this category concern the matching of different types of youth with different service combinations. This involves experiments with work vs. work plus remediation vs. straight remediation as treatment options. It also includes attempts to mix disadvantaged and more affluent participants, as well as youth with older workers.

5. Education and Training Approaches: The products in this category present the findings of structured experiments to test the impact and effectiveness of various education and vocational training approaches including specific education methodologies for the disadvantaged, alternative education approaches and advanced career training.

6. Pre-Employment and Transition Services: The products in this category present the findings of structured experiments to test the impact and effectiveness of school-to-work transition activities, vocational exploration, job-search assistance and other efforts to better prepare youth for labor market success.

7. Youth Work Experience: The products in this category address the organization of work activities, their output, productive roles for youth, and the impacts of various employment approaches.

8. Implementation Issues: This category includes cross-cutting analyses of the practical lessons concerning "how-to-do-it." Issues such as learning curves, replication processes and programmatic "batting averages" will be addressed under this category, as well as the comparative advantages of alternative delivery agents.

9. Design and Organizational Alternatives: The products in this category represent assessments of demonstrations of alternative program and delivery arrangements such as consolidation, year-round preparation for summer programs, the use of incentives, and multi-year tracking of individuals.

10. Special Needs Groups: The products in this category present findings on the special problems of and the programmatic adaptations needed for significant segments including minorities, young mothers, troubled youth, Indochinese refugees, and the handicapped.

11. Innovative Approaches: The products in this category present the findings of those activities designed to explore new approaches. The subjects covered include the Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects, private sector initiatives, the national youth service experiment, and energy initiatives in weatherization, low-head hydroelectric dam restoration, windpower, and the like.

12. Institutional Linkages: The products in this category include studies of institutional arrangements and linkages as well as assessments of demonstration activities to encourage such linkages with education, volunteer groups, drug abuse, and other youth serving agencies.

In each of these knowledge development categories, there will be a range of discrete demonstration, research and evaluation activities focused on different policy, program and analytical issues. In turn, each discrete knowledge development project may have a series of written products addressed to different dimensions of the issue. For instance, all experimental demonstration projects have both process and impact evaluations, frequently undertaken by different evaluation agents. Findings will be published as they become available so that there will usually be a series of reports as evidence accumulates. To organize these products, each publication is classified in one of the twelve broad knowledge development categories, described in terms of the more specific issue, activity or cluster of activities to which it is addressed, with an identifier of the product and what it represents relative to other products in the demonstrations. Hence, the multiple products under a knowledge development activity are closely interrelated and the activites in each broad cluster have significant interconnections.

This volume should be assessed in conjunction with Program Models and Innovations and Improving the Design and Operation of the Summer Program, Volume II which both identify model programs and elements.

Robert Taggart
Administrator
Office of Youth Programs

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME I

		PAGE
OVERVIEW		i
SECTION I -	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	vii
I.	Nine YEDPA Programs	1
II.	The Implementation Of These Nine Programs	1
III.	What YEDPA Is, What Its Goals Are, And What It Has Done So Far	2
IV.	Some Background On Policy Implementation	8
V.	The Effectiveness Of The Implementation Of These Nine Programs	11
VI.	The Development Of A Social Policy Infrastructure At The Local Level	29
VII.	YEDPA's Effective Implementation In A Variety Of Settings	34
VIII.	What This Report Does And Does Not Do	35
SECTION II -	ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION	
I.	Focusing On The Implementation Stage	68
II.	Implementation: Complex Program Assembly And A Process Of Avoiding Pitfalls	71
III.	Program Assembly	71
IV.	Successful Program Assembly: A Strong Executive, The Creation Of Interest Convergence, And Securing It Down To The Worksite	73
V.	Implementation: A Process Of Avoiding Pitfalls	79
VI.	The Benefits Of Previous Direct Operating Experience	79
VII.	Building And Modeling New YEDPA Programs On Previously Successful Programs	82
VIII.	Scenario Writing: Another Aid In Anticipating Implementation Pitfalls	83
IX.	Institutionalizing Evaluation And Reassessment Mechanisms	86
X.	The Need For Strong Program Executives And The Pursuit Of "Fixer" Strategies	88
XI.	A Program Executive's Contributions As A "Double Agent"	91
XII.	Program Executives' Ties To Sources Of Jobs	93
XIII.	Executive Talent Is More Scarce Than Money Or Good Ideas	94
XIV.	The Need For Modest And Simple Program Design	95
XV.	Maintaining The Diversity of YEDPA's Overall Design As A National Program	97
XVI.	Some Final Thoughts	99

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This summary contains two sections. The "introduction" presents our most general findings and explains what the report does and does not do. The second section, "analysis and recommendations," combines these two: the recommendations are closely based on our analysis of nine YEDPA programs. Thus these recommendations should indicate to the reader the actual conditions that we found contributing to effective implementation in the nine. For this summary, the second section merely asserts the conclusions of our analysis. The detailed evidence and illustration behind them are presented in the body of the Final Report, with the complete case studies of the nine in Volume II, Appendix B.

(I) NINE YEDPA PROGRAMS

Our report focuses exclusively on nine YEDPA programs* selected on the basis of preliminary evidence (collected by us and previous investigators who had analyzed scores of YEDPA programs) which indicated that these nine had been effectively implemented.

Our analysis first addressed the question of whether in fact these nine programs were implemented effectively. Then, to the extent that they were implemented effectively, we attempted to explain why they were. Finally, we attempted to analyze the policy implications of our descriptions and explanations in order to frame recommendations.

Our analysis was greatly assisted by the cooperation of the staffs of these nine programs and many DOL administrators, especially Robert Taggart, Joseph Seiler, Janet Rosenberg, and Frank Slobig.

(II) THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE NINE PROGRAMS

Implementation generally was effective in the nine programs analyzed. These programs generally satisfied to a significant degree our broad criteria for effective implementation:

- The program was able to hold delay to a reasonable level.

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* Albuquerque's WORP, Albuquerque's THE, Baltimore's YouthWorks, New Haven's Ventures in Community Improvement Program, Newark's Independence High School, Pittsburgh's STAY, Portland's Emergency Home Repair Program, San Antonio's YCCIP, Syracuse's BOCES-Hancock Training Program.

- The program was able to hold financial costs to a reasonable level.

- The program was able to meet its original objectives without significant alteration or underachievement of these objectives. (Here we mean the specific objectives of DOL and local program executives rather than merely the general objectives of the original legislative mandate.)

(III) WHAT YEDPA IS, WHAT ITS GOALS ARE, AND WHAT IT HAS DONE SO FAR

(A) The Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 represented a major new federal initiative aimed at understanding and alleviating the problems of unemployed youth. YEDPA created four new programs (each with a different target and different strategies), and developed a complex process of "knowledge development" (which mounted a variety of studies, demonstration projects, and experiments). The size and scope of the Act are significant: nearly $1.7 billion through the end of this fiscal year and 460 CETA Prime Sponsors serving nearly 230,000 youth slots in YEDPA programs. Nevertheless, YEDPA should be viewed as a beginning: an important first step in addressing in a comprehensive, diverse, innovative, and often experimental fashion, what has been described as a national crisis--staggering levels of youth unemployment, primarily concentrated in poor urban and rural areas.

During the process of selecting the nine upon which we would focus, we collected preliminary evidence on scores of other YEDPA programs. Our preliminary impression is that in addition to the nine we selected, many of these other YEDPA programs were implemented rather effectively. Moreover, for the nine we analyzed, during the first eighteeen months of YEDPA's existence, implementation seems to have occurred more rapidly than usually is the case for most social programs.

(B) YEDPA is comprised of four programs:

Youth Conservation and Community Improvement Projects (YCCIP). YCCIP's purpose is "to provide youth experiencing severe difficulties obtaining employment with well-supervised work in projects that produce tangible benefits to the community" (usually involving work which would otherwise not be carried out; including a range of community improvements such as public housing rehabilitation and repairs to the homes of the low income persons. $115 million was allocated to YCCIP, which has served nearly 32,000 youth in YEDPA's first fiscal year.

Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects (YIEPP): YIEPP is the most experimental of the YEDPA programs. Its explicit purpose is to demonstrate "the efficacy of guaranteeing otherwise unavailable employment" to disadvantaged youth who "resume or maintain attendance in secondary school" or in an equivalency program. YIEPP's fundamental goal is to test the effect of assured work on school attendance. $115 million was reserved for the Entitlements and through March 1979, over 50,000 youth had been served in the 17 Entitlement projects. Over 80% were from minority groups. The minority percentage is the highest for any of YEDPA's parts.

Youth Employment and Training Programs (YETP): YETP is the lynchpin of YEDPA with programs ranging from "community betterment activities" similar to YCCIP to a host of "training and services" generally similar to those already allowed under CETA Title II B.

Several features distinguish YETP from the other parts of YEDPA and from previous CETA youth programs, although most of them are matters of degree and emphasis: broader eligibility; an elaborate planning process; the involvement of public schools; coordination with other parts of CETA; and allowances for experimentation.

Twenty-two percent of the money allocated to each prime sponsor was to be "used for programs for in-school youth carried out pursuant to agreements between prime sponsors and local educational agencies". This 22% set-aside is probably the most well known provision of YEDPA.

The original appropriation for YETP was $537 million, with 185,600 participants enrolled in YETP through March 1979, (over three times the number enrolled in YEDPA's other three programs combined).

Young Adult Conservation Corps (YACC): The Young Adult Conservation Corps was created through a new Title added to CETA to offer employment to "youths who would otherwise not be currently productively employed" through "useful conservation work" on "public lands and waters". It is administered through an Interagency agreement with the Departments of Interior and Agriculture who virtually manage all of YACC. Except for the modest referral role of the Employment Service and some pro forma coordination requirements, YACC is divorced entirely from the CETA system. This is a major reason that this study did not include any YACC programs. We also focused exclusively on the other three types of programs because they will be considered for refunding in 1980 while YACC will not come up for refunding until 1982.

(C) In general terms, the accomplishments of YEDPA are quite significant.

- Nearly 750,000 youths have participated in YEDPA programs during the first two years of implementation.
- YEDPA's major programs have been implemented by the nation's CETA prime sponsor system.
- Innovative experiments have been put in place both on the national and local level.
- Research commissioned through YEDPA has greatly expanded knowledge about the extent and causes of youth unemployment.
- For the first time, the youth employment system has been brought into substantial contact with public secondary education.
- Youth unemployment rates have come down, with YEDPA accounting for most of the new jobs gained by minority youths in the past year.
- The majority of youths served by YEDPA are from minority groups. In the twenty years prior to YEDPA, employment/population ratios for black youth fell almost in half and unemployment rates nearly tripled. Some improvement in black youth labor force participation has occurred in the 1977-79 period, although official jobless rates partially mask the progress by not revealing the extent of new young entrants. Over the past two years, for example, unemployment

rates for white youth age 16-21 decreased 3.1 percentage points while it decreased 4.8 points for minority youth and there was a 20% increase in the employment of black teenagers ages 16 to 19. It is estimated that at least half this increase stems from YEDPA and the other federal youth initiatives.

- Numbers alone do not reveal the remarkable range of local programs.
- The employment and training system has been capable of adapting to new requirements, of cutting through normally expected delays and of providing youth job opportunities on a large scale and rather quickly.
- Prime Sponsors have targeted their programs on the economically disadvantaged to a degree greater than required by YEDPA.
- Work performed under YEDPA has been shown to have both tangible community benefits and genuine economic value.
- There is a growing consensus, on all levels, that private, for-profit employers must be more deeply involved in solving the nation's youth employment problems. YEDPA has achieved more private sector involvement than any previous federal effort.
- The 22 percent set-aside tends to work well as a financial incentive for Local Education Agencies to participate in joint action with the prime sponsor.
- Prime sponsors are capable of managing youth programs, even those with the scale and complexity of the Entitlement, although their capability varies greatly.
- The knowledge development strategy has been particularly effective in devising innovative delivery approaches (such as intermediary corporations) structuring demonstration projects, coordinating basic research, and increasing awareness of the value of experimentation.
- YEDPA has led to increased connections between prime sponsors and a multiplicity of community based and non-profit organizations. The record is less auspicious with unions and private employers.

(IV) THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE NINE PROGRAMS

The complete details of the degree to which these nine programs satisfied our three criteria for effective implementation are in Appendix B. There are summaries in the introduction, presented roughly in the order of each program's

effectiveness of implementation (ranked by quartiles). There are no exact rankings because the nature of the data does not lend itself to such precision:

Very Effective Implementation: Pittsburgh's STAY, New Haven's VICI

Highly Effective Implementation: Portland's EHR, Syracuse's BOCES-Hancock, Albuquerque's THE program

Medium Effective Implementation: Albuquerque's WORP program, Newark's IHS

Borderline Effective Implementation: Baltimore's YouthWorks, San Antonio's YCCIP

Even these quartile rankings are not exact, and there is an overlap between most programs in contiguous categories. But their major purpose is to indicate that though all nine were effectively implemented, there is significant variation in the degree of effective implementation of each. This variation is significant because it seems to be associated with the presence or absence of some of the conditions that we found to contribute to effective implementation of YEDPA.

(V) THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SOCIAL POLICY INFRASTRUCTURE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

We found that the conditions in 1979 surrounding the implementation of YEDPA (and similar domestic programs) seem to be significantly more favorable for effective implementation than they were fifteen or even ten years ago, especially <u>local</u> conditions. Thus many of our recommendations are more feasible today than in the past. They are based on programs that are more replicable than in the past because these favorable conditions are more widespread now.

(A) As Sar Levitan has argued, actors and designers at both the federal and local level learned a lot about designing and implementing social policy during the 1960's and 70's.

- <u>However, in addition to this learning, in the past fifteen years a rich and developed social policy infrastructure has grown up at the local level</u>.

The individuals and organizations which comprise this infrastructure are oriented toward innovation and social progress. Many are alumni of Great Society programs, others are alumni of the post-Great Society innovative programs of DOL and HUD.

The individuals represent a new class of activist bureaucrats. Organizers is a good functional description; likening them to community or labor organizers captures a good deal of their background and personal predilection. However, they play a larger role and their "positioning" is broader (e.g., they are bureaucrats).

We also found rich organizational development. These organizations are "established". These persons have helped to develop numerous community-based organizations (CBO's) as well as new public agencies (or special programs within them). These organizations are experienced, effective, and relatively prosperous.

(B) All this has produced complex organizational and personal networks that link persons and organizations and give them overlapping interests. The networks have grown over time and are built on past relationships and trust. All of this greatly facilitates securing joint action and program assembly. They smooth the way for effective implementation.

(C) For YEDPA a good deal of this learning, experience, infrastructure and a good many outstanding alumni have developed directly and indirectly from CETA and earlier manpower programs. YEDPA has benefited greatly from CETA's positive and negative lessons.

(D) These organizations and individuals have not used these experiences, knowledge, and networks to become conservative. They have used it to become more innovative. They are established, but they are not "establishment". They continue to seek new programs, new solutions and are open to experiment and change.

(E) The development of this local infrastructure and local networks that smooth the way for effective implementation represents a major change from the pattern described in the implementation literature on programs of the 1960's and early 1970's. A common theme in those studies was the implementation difficulties caused by local actors. At worst, local actors were found to resist innovative federal designs and programs. At best, even when they sought to aid implementation, local actors were found to be lacking in sufficient resources and/or abilities to make it work.

- By contrast, our findings of these local infrastructures and networks means that local conditions and actors now tend to provide an extra boost to the implementation of federal designs and programs rather than an obstacle.

(VI) YEDPA'S EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION IN A VARIETY OF SETTINGS

We found that within the pattern of effective implementation of these nine programs there is a good deal of programmatic, geographical, and socio-economic variation. It occurred in different types of YEDPA programs (the nine include two YIEPP programs--a Tier 1 and a Tier 2--two YCCIP programs, and five YETP programs) and in different types of cities (varying by size, region, economic bases, and ethnic and income mixes). Of course, all of this is no accident; our program selection sought to produce these variations.

The nature of our data and analysis are such that no systematic conclusions can be drawn from this variation. However, effective implementation of YEDPA in such a variety of settings is significant because it gives a rough indication that the possibilities of effectiveness are not limited to any one type of program or city.

(VII) WHAT THIS REPORT DOES AND DOES NOT DO

We can tell the Task Force much about--

- How to improve the implementation of these programs
- How to avoid implementation failures.

We cannot tell the Task Force with full confidence how to produce ultimately effective outcomes from youth employment programs.

We analyzed the effectiveness of the implementation of these nine programs, but not their ultimate outcomes. Of course, our ultimate goal is a policy that has effective outcomes (one whose effect on the target population is positive; one that tends to ameliorate that social problem in response to which it was created, or at least creates some positive change in it). In addition to being adopted effectively and then implemented effectively, it must be first a good policy, with a design appropriate to the problem. "A fast train is worse than a slow one if it takes you in the wrong direction." Thus effective implementation is necessary to achieve an effective outcome but not sufficient in itself.

Why then does this study focus almost exclusively on the element of implementation? First, to analyze conditions and factors associated with effective outcomes, we must be able to measure the outcomes (e.g., the effects of the program on its participants). However, these nine YEDPA programs are so relatively new that there as yet has not been enough time for the program to have measurable effects on a large number of participants. (All had been in their YEDPA operation for less than eighteen months at the time of this study, June 1979. But on the whole, these nine YEDPA programs have been implemented more rapidly than usually is the case for most social programs.) Thus, placement data (one indicator of outcomes) are scarce as yet. Moreover, simple placement data do not yield in themselves definitive conclusions about outcomes because they are shaped or "contaminated" by factors other than programs' effectiveness (e.g., the tightness of the local labor market and other environmental factors).

In focusing almost exclusively on implementation, we are able to say less than we would like to. But we are interested in action rather than pure social science and thus reject the alternative of saying more, but have to wait to do so until the outcomes are fully discernible and measurable.

- Second, of the three major elements required for an effective outcome--an effective design, effective adoption, and effective implementation--presently the most difficult one to achieve is effective implementation.

It is the element on which domestic social policies most frequently founder. Indeed, in the past decade or so, problems at the implementation stage have been the largest source of social policy failures and this is predictable. When the implementation of programs depends on many actors, as it must in our heterogeneous society and pluralistic political system, there are numerous possibilities for disagreement and delay.

Tables 1 - 15 indicate how the multiplicity of participants and perspectives in a YEDPA program combine to produce a formidable obstacle course of policy implementation (summarized on Table A of the executive summary, p. xii). However, these obstacles to effective implementation are generic to social policymaking in the U.S. rather than limited to youth employment programs. This is the lesson of the broad range of case studies which we review from outside this area.

TABLE A

POINTS OF DECISION AND CLEARANCE NECESSARY FOR COMPLETION OF EACH OF THE NINE YEDPA PROGRAMS: THE MULTIPLICITY OF PARTICIPANTS, PERSPECTIVES, AND AGREEMENTS THAT SHAPED THE COURSE OF EACH PROGRAM.

PROGRAM	Decision Points	Participants	Cumulative Total of Agreements
Pittsburgh's STAY	10	39	50
New Haven's VICI	19	22	72
Portland's EHR	15	13	31
Syracuse's BOCES-HANCOCK	13	12	46
Albuquerque's THE	11	98	119
Albuquerque's WORP	8	6	23
Newark's IHS	12	20	33
Baltimore's YouthWorks	15	408	446
San Antonio's YCCIP	9	13	22

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ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations in this report are empirically grounded. They do not represent our wishful thinking. Rather they are specifically based on our analysis of these nine YEDPA programs and secondary analysis of earlier studies for OYP.

Since they are empirically based, these recommendations also should indicate to the reader the actual conditions that we found contributing to effective implementation in these nine. They are, however, written in the format of recommendations rather than as descriptions to make them more useful to the following audiences who want answers to the question: "O.K., this is how those programs worked and why, but what do we do on Monday?"

- Program Operators
- Analysts in VPTFYE, DOL, and Congress who are drafting legislation
- OYP and ETA policymakers who are making allocational decisions

For this summary, we merely assert the conclusions of our analysis. The detailed evidence and illustration behind them are presented in the body of the report, with the complete case studies of the nine in Appendix B.

(I) FOCUSING ON THE IMPLEMENTATION STAGE

For the following reasons we recommend that YEDPA policymakers at the top, program operators, and everyone in-between focus a disproportionate amount of their attention and resources on the implementation stage of these programs. (For some, such as OYP under Robert Taggart, this will represent a continuation of their already significant effort at process evaluation.)

(A) Of the three major elements required for an effective outcome--an effective design, effective adoption, and effective implementation--presently the most difficult to achieve is effective implementation. It is the element on which domestic social policies most frequently founder.

Currently there are many good general ideas for ameliorating social problems and many good specific policy designs. But the legislative successes (the adoption stage) of yesterday have often become the implementation problems of today. Since the mid-1960's it has become much easier for good policy ideas to traverse the adoption stage without major alterations. But then they were implemented ineffectively and did not create effective outcomes for citizens. Their implementation was either (a) inordinately delayed, or (b) it required expenditures far beyond what objectively was necessary, or (c) there was an alteration and/or underachievement of the policy's objectives, or some combination of all three.

(B) We also recommend giving more attention to the implementation stage in order to sensitize policymakers to the essential role of implementation in creating effective outcomes. There is ample evidence that most of the increased lip service paid to implementation in the last few years is just that. The belief that implementation issues are relatively insignificant remains firmly grounded in many otherwise astute policymakers and policy analysts for several understandable reasons.

(II) IMPLEMENTATION: COMPLEX PROGRAM ASSEMBLY AND A PROCESS OF AVOIDING PITFALLS

More specifically,we recommend that these actors become sensitized to the true nature of implementation:

- First, effective implementation does not occur automatically. Rather it is a complex process of program assembly. It requires joint action to achieve the full assemblage.

- Second, major difficulties will almost always characterize the process of policy implementation, especially if the policies are even mildly innovative. Implementation is a process of avoiding pitfalls.

(III) PROGRAM ASSEMBLY

Program assembly should be viewed as involving the following general elements:

- Numerous actors (organizations and individual) are involved in the program assembly process (e.g., for a YEDPA program: The local program itself and its staff, the prime sponsor, the larger political entity and its leaders--the Mayor, the schools, the unions, public sector worksites, private sector worksites, CBO's, and post-program employers; often DOL and Regional DOL are also relevant actors as well as intermediate bodies like YouthWork, CPPV, MDRC or HUD).

- These actors have significant interests which are largely independent of each other and independent of the YEDPA program and/or of the prime sponsor and its larger political entity.

(IV) SUCCESSFUL PROGRAM ASSEMBLY: A STRONG EXECUTIVE, THE CREATION OF INTEREST CONVERGENCE, AND SECURING IT DOWN TO THE WORKSITE

Successful program assembly should involve the following elements:

- The program assembly process should be guided by a strong, effective executive. It will not run itself. It has to be put together piece by piece. Actors and interests have to be cajoled, convinced, and persuaded into joint action. Adjustments and adaptations have to be made. Coalitions have to be built.

- Perhaps the most essential action or strategy for effective program assembly is the creation of a pattern of interest convergence in the relevant actors and interests through the development of complementary incentives.

The executive should distribute incentives that will lead actors to find their interest and the interest of the YEDPA program in convergence: situations in which while achieving his own objectives, one actor also contributes to achieving the objectives of another actor (e.g., we found that the work-providing agencies could not receive the free labor they sought to increase their productivity without simultaneously providing the YCCIP programs with the worksites which they sought).

- Program assembly in a YEDPA program must be secured all the way down to the worksite and through to the process of job placement. Worksite management is difficult; it will not occur automatically.

Securing cooperation from bureaucratic actors and achieving the appropriate recruitments (participants that fit income and minority targets; meaningful worksites; good supervisors) are necessary but not sufficient steps. The program executive next must be certain that something is going on at the worksites: the difficult task of teaching skill functions must be achieved. The least automatic part of assembling a YEDPA program is the development of satisfactory job placement, and it requires constant efforts by the program executive.

(V) IMPLEMENTATION: A PROCESS OF AVOIDING PITFALLS

We now return to the details of the second major element of implementation.

- We recommend that YEDPA policymakers come to assume that major difficulties will almost always characterize implementation and that it is a process of avoiding pitfalls. They cannot assume that someone else will consider the issue of implementation feasibility and that someone else will worry about the specific steps of program assembly.

- The major strategy for avoiding implementation pitfalls should be steps to anticipate them so as to develop ways of avoiding them, coping with them, and/or overcoming them.

The next eleven sections suggest some anticipatory tactics. They are described roughly in ascending order of importance.

(VI) THE BENEFITS OF PREVIOUS DIRECT OPERATING EXPERIENCE

YEDPA designers and implementors will be better able to anticipate implementation pitfalls if they previously have had direct operating experience in another YEDPA or manpower or education program. (A corollary: we found that the separation between planning and implementation, which has plagued many earlier federal programs, can be bridged if the program planner then becomes the program operator.)

(VII) BUILDING AND MODELING NEW YEDPA PROGRAMS ON PREVIOUSLY SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS

The supply of persons with operating experience obviously is limited, even though recently it has been growing. Also, it is usually more reliable to base policy strategies on institutional, impersonal factors rather than on personal, individualistic ones.

- We thus recommend an additional strategy: building new YEDPA programs on youth programs previously successful in that locality or modeling YEDPA programs on other successful programs so as to avoid continually "reinventing the wheel".

New programs have many advantages, but when a program is new, untried and innovative, it is not possible to anticipate all or even most of the likely implementation difficulties. Our findings indicate that building on a prior one or modeling it after one increases the ability to anticipate implementation pitfalls.

(VIII) SCENARIO WRITING: ANOTHER AID IN ANTICIPATING IMPLEMENTATION PITFALLS

Since it is not always possible or desirable to build or model upon a prior program, we recommend the writing of a scenario as an additional aid in anticipating implementation difficulties.

Scenario writing involves the imaginative construction of future sequences of actions, the resulting conditions and reactions, and in turn the further conditions and reactions that are developed by all actors and organizations.

- Scenario writing sensitizes program executives to obstacles ahead and helps develop a "dirty mind": the tendency to anticipate and predict implementation difficulties and be especially attuned to the interests involved and their likelihood of delaying, even resisting the planned implementation route (a "dirty mind" would have predicted the ineffective implementation of the swine flu vaccination campaign).

Scenario writing brings the likely flaws and problems to the forefront and forces designers and program executives to try to take account of them.

Unlike almost all of our other recommendations, scenario writing is not primarily extrapolated from our findings. Only the New Haven program made approximate use of it. But our recommendation is also based on the findings in other areas, both positive and negative (e.g., the swine flu case).

(IX) INSTITUTIONALIZING EVALUATION AND REASSESSMENT MECHANISMS

A "dirty mind" is aware that most implementation difficulties cannot be anticipated fully and that a program's implementation cannot even come close to being free of error. The test of a good program is not the absence of error, but the ability to detect its own errors and then correct them.

- Thus we recommend that the processes of anticipation, prediction, error detection and correction be institutionalized beyond scenario writing by building into YEDPA programs mechanisms for feedback, evaluation, and reassessment of implementation. In many of the nine programs, the processes of evaluation and reassessment led to the detection and correction of serious implementation problems.

(X) THE NEED FOR STRONG PROGRAM EXECUTIVES AND THE PURSUIT OF "FIXER" STRATEGIES

Detecting errors without being able to execute remedies is useless and frustrating. Neither program assembly nor the subsequent adaptation-compensation responses run by themselves. They should be guided by a strong executive who has enough power to operate.

- We also recommend that program executives consciously adopt "fixer" strategies.

A "fixer" is a person who makes repairs and adjustments in the implementation process to make it work. The "fixer's" adaptations and compensations are designed to protect, correct, and sometimes expand his program, especially through coalition building and constant intervention in administrative detail. There is always a need for compensating in the implementation process for omissions made at the design and adoption stages, which are inadvertent (because then we can never anticipate fully all the later implementation difficulties) and intended (because it was not politically or financially feasible to include them earlier). Numerous instances of each of these elements of the "fixer" strategy were used in the nine cases.

(XI) A PROGRAM EXECUTIVE'S CONTRIBUTIONS AS A "DOUBLE AGENT"

We recommend that prime sponsors seek program executives who can play the role of "double agent".

- Some program executives in the nine cases made major contributions to effective implementation by acting as a "double agent". This role consisted of the ability to secure joint action among various interests in the program assembly process by virtue of the executive's standing and membership in more than one of the relevant camps in the implementation process. A double agent activates and operationalizes linkages between organizations, agencies and other persons.

In particular, all these double agents had direct experience with or access to major providers of jobs (most of which were either in the private sector or with a semi-public agency).

In 1979 it does not seem gratuitous to advise prime sponsors to try to find "double agents." The social policy infrastructure and overlapping organizational and personal networks have developed locally so much in the past decade that there seems to have been a significant increase in the supply of talented program executives in general and potential "double agents" in particular.

Despite this recent increase, potential program executives continue to be relatively scarce because of our limited knowledge of how to increase their supply by exogenous means. The limits this places on strategies built around executives will be discussed shortly.

(XII) PROGRAM EXECUTIVES' TIES TO SOURCES OF JOBS

Prime sponsors in particular ought to seek program executives who already have ties to sources of jobs.

There are so many ways that money can be absorbed in a manpower program before one gets to job development that there is a tendency to forget that jobs are essential for its effective implementation. Developing an effective classroom component is not easy but it is much easier than getting good jobs for youths.

- These program executives' ties preferably should be to private sector jobs.

Private sector jobs are more likely to constrain youths in positive ways because someone there is more likely to care if the youth doesn't show up or does his job poorly. As Arnold Packer, Assistant Secretary of Labor, has said, "Public sector jobs developed for youth typically tend to be short on providing enough of the discipline needed to hold down a private sector job."

There is a need to emphasize private sector jobs because they tend to be overlooked. Manpower programs are public sector organizations and are run primarily by persons who have spent most of their careers in the public sector (or academic world). Thus it is understandable that program executives and their superiors are oriented toward public sector job development.

(XIII) EXECUTIVE TALENT IS MORE SCARCE THAN MONEY OR GOOD IDEAS

Our advice about fixers and double agents, though sound, has limits.

- The fixer strategy is difficult to replicate. Talent is more scarce than either money or good ideas, especially at the executive level. And we have very imperfect knowledge of how to develop such executives.

As Professor James Q. Wilson has argued: "The supply of able, experienced executives is not increasing nearly as fast as the number of problems being addressed by public policy. This deserves emphasis, for it is rarely recognized as a constrain[illegible] Anyone who opposed a bold new program on the grounds that there was nobody around able to run it would be accused of being a petifogger at best and a reactionary do-nothing at worst."

(XIV) THE NEED FOR MODEST AND SIMPLE PROGRAM DESIGN

In light of the scarcity of such persons, we recommend that the design of YEDPA should not rely exclusively on their presence. Moreover, the near necessity of talented executives to achieve effective implementation, coupled with their scarcity, leads us to recommend a commensurate modesty in YEDPA program design and in our overall expectations for the programs' effectiveness.

- YEDPA program designs should be innovative but realistic in that they:
  - (a) anticipate implementation difficulties;
  - (b) are modest, straightforward, and even simple.

We have already discussed what we mean by this anticipation process. Program designs should be modest and simple in that they maintain YEDPA's focus on the goals of job experience, training, job development, and placement. By keeping to these specific purposes, YEDPA's implementation becomes more manageable and more likely to avoid the implementation pitfalls which have beset other social programs since the mid-1960's.

Effective implementation is a function, to a significant degree, of good local administration, but that is not sufficient in itself. Even if and when a local program has a talented program executive, he and the entire implementation process may founder on a highly complex program design.

(XV) MAINTAINING THE DIVERSITY OF YEDPA'S OVERALL DESIGN AS A NATIONAL PROGRAM

A strength of YEDPA's overall design as a national program seems to be the diversity it encompasses (e.g., the nine programs included two from YIEPP, two from YCCIP, and five from YETP, with a good deal of diversity among local program designs). Moreover, the flexible overall federal design has allowed this diversity to develop rather than mandating it.

- We recommend that DOL continue to allow and encourage this diversity through continuing its flexible approach.

Youth employment is not a single problem with a single cause or a single manifestation. It is a constellation of interrelated problems with complex sources, occurring all across a large and heterogeneous nation. Thus, both to maximize effective outcomes and to maximize learning, it seems wise to simultaneously allow various policy approaches to it.

We do not recommend that diversity be required through the maintenance of three or four separate programs within YEDPA. Rather, programmatic and local diversity should be allowed and encouraged in the specific design of individual programs.

xxx

Final Report

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(I) NINE YEDPA PROGRAMS

Our report focuses exclusively on nine YEDPA programs* selected on the basis of preliminary evidence (collected by us and previous investigators who had analyzed scores of YEDPA programs**) which indicated that these nine had been effectively implemented.

Our analysis first addressed the question of whether in fact these nine programs were implemented effectively. Then, to the extent that they were implemented effectively, we attempted to explain why they were. Finally, we attempted to analyze the policy implications of our descriptions and explanations in order to frame recommendations.

Our analysis was greatly assisted by the cooperation of the staffs of these nine programs and many DOL administrators, especially Robert Taggart, Joseph Seiler, Janet Rosenberg, and Frank Slobig.

(II) THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE NINE PROGRAMS

Implementation generally was effective in these nine programs. These programs generally satisfied to a significant degree our broad criteria for effective implementation:

- The program was able to hold delay to a reasonable level.
- The program was able to hold financial costs to a reasonable level.

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*Albuquerque's WORP, Albuquerque's THE, Baltimore's YouthWorks, New Haven's Ventures in Community Improvement Program, Newark's Independence High School, Pittsburgh's STAY, Portland's Emergency Home Repair Program, San Antonio's YCCIP, Syracuse's BOCES-Hancock Training Program.

**In "References" (p.100), see Wurzburg (1978a), Wurzburg (1978b), Dement (1978), Ball (1979a), Ball (1979b), Feldman and Ostrower (1979).

- The program was able to meet its original objectives without significant alteration or underachievement of these objectives. (Here we mean the specific objectives of DOL and local program executives rather than merely the general objectives of the original legislative mandate.

(III) WHAT YEDPA IS, WHAT ITS GOALS ARE, AND WHAT IT HAS DONE SO FAR*

The Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 represented a major new Federal initiative aimed at understanding and alleviating the problems of unemployed youth. YEDPA created four new programs, each of which had different target groups and different strategies. It also doubled the size of the Job Corps and set in motion an elaborate and complex process of "knowledge development" through which a variety of studies, demonstration projects, and experiments have been mounted in the past two years.

The size and scope of the Act are significant: nearly $1.7 billion through the end of this fiscal year and 460 CETA Prime Sponsors serving nearly 230,000 youth slots in YEDPA programs. Nevertheless, YEDPA should be viewed as a beginning: an important first step in addressing in a comprehensive, diverse, innovative, and often experimental fashion, what has been described as a national crisis--staggering levels of youth unemployment, primarily concentrated in poor urban and rural areas.

During the process of selecting the nine programs upon which we would focus, we collected preliminary evidence on scores of other YEDPA programs. Our preliminary impression is that in addition to the nine we selected, many of these other YEDPA programs were implemented rather effectively.

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*This section is primarily based on the excellent material developed by Erik Butler and James Darr in The Youth Employment Demonstration Projects Act of 1977: Preliminary Lessons

Moreover, for the nine we analyzed, during the first eighteen months of YEDPA's existence implementation seems to have occurred more rapidly than usually is the case for most social programs.

YEDPA is comprised of four programs: Youth Employment & Training Programs (YETP). YETP is the lynchpin of YEDPA. Its goals are sweeping and ambitious: programs "designed to make a significant long-term impact on the structural unemployment problems of youth". These programs can range from "community betterment activities" similar to YCCIP to a host of "training and services" generally similar to those already allowed under CETA Title II B.

Several features distinguish YETP from the other parts of YEDPA and from previous CETA youth programs, though most are matters of degree and emphasis: broader eligibility; an elaborate planning process; the involvement of public schools; coordination with other parts of CETA; allowances for experimentation. Eligible participants are so-called "in-school" youth who are unemployed or underemployed and whose family income does not exceed 85% of the lower living standard.

The YETP planning process required consultation with unions and community based organizations, an inventory of local needs and resources, special coordination with local education agencies (LEAs) and the establishment of Youth Councils (with youth members). Twenty-two percent* of the money allocated to each prime sponsor was to be "used for programs for in-school youth carried out pursuant to agreements between prime sponsors and local educational agencies." This 22% set aside is probably the most well known provision of YEDPA and the one which has caused the greatest immediate change in the planning activities of prime sponsors.

*In discussing the dollar allocations for YEDPA, we have stayed with the original appropriations in order to provide a sense of their relative share of the funds. Actual expenditures have varied so much that the subsequent funding years alter this balance considerably.

The original appropriation for YETP was $537 million, of which about $450 million was available to prime sponsors and Governors. As of March 31, 1979, there were 185,600 participants enrolled in YETP programs, excluding those involved in the discretionary projects. This is over three times the number enrolled in YEDPA's other three programs (YACC, YIEPP, and YCCIP) combined. Over 80% of YETP participants were economically disadvantaged, and about half were women and half minorities.

Youth Conservation & Community Improvement Projects (YCCIP): YCCIP's purpose is: "to provide youth experiencing severe difficulties obtaining employment with well-supervised work in projects that produce tangible benefits to the community"

Appropriate projects are defined by the Act as being "work which would otherwise not be carried out" and can include a range of "community improvements" such as rehabilitation of public housing, repairs to the homes of low-income residents, energy conservation measures, and park maintenance.

The Act emphasizes the quality of the supervision provided to youths in YCCIP projects and the need to coordinate the youths' work experience with local education agencies, including "the awarding of academic credit". At the same time, proposed projects are to be "labor intensive" and to provide "job training and skill development opportunities".

YCCIP is the only part of YEDPA with mandated limits on administrative costs (10% of project funds) and participant wages (at least 65% of total project costs). $115 million was allocated for YCCIP, equal to the amount for YIEPP.

Nearly 32,000 youth were served by YCCIP in the first YEDPA fiscal year (1978) and over 80% of these were economically disadvantaged, indicating that prime sponsors more than met the special emphasis of the law. Over 50% of those served were minorities, but only a quarter of the enrollees were women.

Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects (YIEPP): YIEPP is the most experimental of the YEDPA programs. Its explicit purpose is to demonstrate "the efficacy of guaranteeing otherwise unavailable employment" to disadvantaged youth who "resume or maintain attendance in secondary school" or "in a program which leads to a certificate of high school equivalency". To be eligible for an Entitlement project, a youth would have to be (a) economically disadvantaged; (b) between 16 and 19 years old; (c) reside in a specific geographic area; and (d) comply with the school attendance provision.

YIEPP's fundamental goal is to test the effect of assured work on school attendance. Subsidiary goals included testing the capacity of prime sponsors to operate such large scale administrative and job creation programs for youth, experimenting with the use of direct wage subsidies in the private sector, and utilizing alternative schooling arrangements to entice out-of-school youth back into the educational system.

Several features of the Entitlement set it apart from the rest of YEDPA: the concept of entitlement; the allowance for private sector wages; the most restricted income eligibility in all of YEDPA; and the most elaborate and rigorous evaluation design.

$115 million has been reserved for the Entitlements. Through March 1979, over 50,000 youth had been served in the Entitlement projects. All were economically disadvantaged, just over half were women, and over 80% were from minority groups. The minority percentage is the highest for any of YEDPA's parts.

Young Adult Conservation Corps (YACC): The Young Adult Conservation Corps was created through a new Title added to CETA. Its purpose was to offer employment to "youths who would otherwise not be currently productively employed" through "useful conservation work" on "public lands and waters".

It is administered through an Interagency agreement with the Departments of Interior and Agriculture who virtually manage all of YACC. Except for the

modest role of the Employment Service in referring applicants and for some pro forma coordination requirements, YACC is divorced entirely from the CETA system. This is a major reason that this study did not include any YACC programs. We also focused exclusively on the other three types of programs because they will be considered for refunding in 1980 while YACC will not come up for refunding until 1982.

In general, the accomplishments of YEDPA are quite significant:

- Nearly 750,000 youths have participated in YEDPA programs during the two years of its implementation.
- YEDPA's major programs have been implemented by the nation's CETA prime sponsor system.
- Innovative experiments have been put in place both on the national and local level.
- Research commissioned through YEDPA has greatly expanded knowledge about the extent and causes of youth unemployment.
- For the first time, the youth employment system has been brought into substantial contact with public secondary education.
- Youth unemployment rates have come down, with YEDPA accounting for most of the new jobs gained by minority youths in the past year.
- Numbers alone do not reveal the remarkable range of local programs.

The following are the specific results of YEDPA:

A. Public Sector Job Creation

- The employment and training system has been capable of adapting to new requirements, of cutting through normally expected delays and of providing youth job opportunities on a large scale and rather quickly.

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*There are 230,000 youth slots in YEDPA, but nearly 750,000 youths have participated because this includes youths who have dropped out or graduated and then replaced by new enrollees.

- The majority of youth served by YEDPA are from minority groups. Between 1954 and 1977, employment/population ratios were almost halved for all groups of black youth. Unemployment rates nearly tripled (from 13.4 to 38.7 percent for the 16-17 group and from 14.7 to 36.1 for the 18-19 group). Some improvement in black youth labor force participation has occurred in the 1977-1979 period, although official jobless rates partially mask the progress by not revealing the extent of new young entrants. Over the past two years, for example, the unemployment rate for white youth age 16-21 decreased 3.1 percentage points while they decreased 4.8 points for minority youth. Government officials also note the 20 percent increase in the employment of black teenagers ages 16 to 19. They estimate that at least half this increase stems from YEDPA and the other federal youth initiatives. A 20-year decline in black teenage labor force participation was reversed for black males in the YEDPA period (it increased from 41.1 percent in 1977 to 47.4 percent in 1979).

- Prime sponsors have targeted their programs on the economically disadvantaged to a degree greater than required by YEDPA.

- Work performed under YEDPA has been shown to have both tangible community benefits and genuine economic value.

B. Access to the Private Sector

There is a growing consensus, on all levels, that private, for-profit employers must be more deeply involved in solving the nation's youth employment problems. Based on their own identification of needs, large and small employers require significantly different policy approaches.

- There has been no long-term or large-scale test of direct wage subsidies for youth in the private sector, but the Entitlement has shown that direct wage subsidies will attract private sector participation.

C. Educational Strategies and Institutions

- The 22 percent set-aside tends to work well as a financial incentive for local Education Agencies to participate in joint action with the prime sponsor.

- Young people previously out of school were attracted to participate in the Entitlement through non-traditional settings, primarily alternative schools.

The YEDPA experience suggests that a more diverse menu of program offerings is required in order to meet the different needs and interests of out-of-school and underachieving youth. A simple "return-to-school" formula is not sufficient.

D. Supportive Services

- Most prime sponsors have planned and offered a wide array of services to youth participants in YETP, YCCIP, and YIEPP.
- Three services--transportation, child care, and health care--have emerged as having an increasing impact on youth employability.

E. Management

- Prime sponsors are capable of managing youth programs, even those with the scale and complexity of the Entitlement, though their capability varies greatly.
- The knowledge development strategy has been particularly effective in devising innovative delivery approaches (such as intermediary corporations), structuring demonstration projects, coordinating basic research, and increasing awareness of the value of experimentation.
- YEDPA has led to increased connections between prime sponsors and a multiplicity of community based and non-profit organizations. The record is less auspicious with unions and private employers.

(IV) SOME BACKGROUND ON POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

The generally effective implementation of the nine YEDPA programs analyzed is no mean accomplishment in light of the frequent ineffective implementation that most analysts of domestic social policy programs have found. Some brief examples of these historical patterns will serve as a useful background and point of contrast for the analysis of the effective implementation of the nine YEDPA programs. They will also indicate the generic nature of implementation difficulties, which is to say the generic nature of the implementation obstacles which these nine YEDPA programs faced and generally overcame.

- In 1965 a new agency, the Economic Development Administration (EDA), was established by Congress. The EDA decided to go into cities for the purpose of providing permanent new jobs to minorities through economic development. In 1966,Oakland was chosen as an experiment in showing how the provision of public works and building loans can provide incentives for employers to hire minorities. All participants at the local and national levels agreed about the program's goals; there was minimum publicity. Ample funds were on hand at the right time. Congressional appropriations, EDA commitment of funds to Oakland, and approval of local projects by city officials and private employers all occurred within a few months.

  EDA was to provide $23 million in loans and grants to enterprises in Oakland which agreed to hire minorities and build facilities leading to minority employment for a total of 3,000 new jobs. The later steps of implementation were felt to be "technical questions" that would resolve themselves once the initial agreements were negotiated and commitments made. But these "technical questions" provided continual problems for five years. Indeed, three years after EDA entered Oakland, only $4 million had been spent and only 63 new jobs had been created. After five years, only $12 million had been spent and only 900 new jobs had been created (Pressman and Wildavsky).*

- In 1967 the Johnson administration launched a new program, New Towns in-Town (NTIT), to create model communities on surplus federal land in metropolitan areas. The NITIT's objectives were to demonstrate the federal government's commitment to help the nation's troubled central cities, build new housing for the poor, and to show how much could be accomplished by a combination of high level political support and imaginative urban planning and new technology. Initial agreements by local officials seemed to federal officials to be widespread. But disagreements rapidly came to the surface. A number of local groups strongly opposed low income public housing; local officials preferred development plans that would yield more tax revenue; and conservationists were opposed to any plans for construction. Finally, after four years, no new towns had been built and practically none had even been started (Derthick).

- In mid-1969, the Lanterman-Petris Short (L-P-S) Act went into effect in California. This law was intended to protect the civil liberties of persons alleged to be mentally ill and to accelerate the trend toward "community" treatment of the mentally ill as an alternative to hospitalization in remote state institutions. Implementation of half of the legislation, protection of civil liberties and a general movement toward de-institutionalization went well. But the other half--provision of outpatient services at the community level--was

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*Authors will be cited in the body of report. See "References" section for complete citations.

very slow, expensive and reached only a portion of those released from state institutions. For instance, in San Mateo County (noted for having the state's most progressive community mental health service system) of 260 patients discharged between June 1972 and December 1973 from Napa State Hospital to San Mateo County, only a minority, 107, received follow-up mental health services. Another 66 received public assistance "welfare" but no mental health services. (Bardach, 1977)

One of the lessons of the above case studies is that at the heart of many instances of ineffective implementation is a vicious cycle of delay. It often may begin with merely minor disagreements between just a few actors or with the minor delays associated with simple standard operating procedures in bureaucracies. But, in the context which routinely characterizes social programs--changing actors, diverse perspectives, and multiple clearance points--these delays often lead to the next step in the cycle: suspicion of ultimate failure or high salvage costs, withdrawal of previous commitments, more delay, increased anxieties, more suspicion, withdrawal, further delay, and so forth.

Furthermore, it seems likely that this pattern of ineffective implementation is not a recent phenomenon. Most of the studies documenting this pattern are based on programs of the 1960's and 70's. But what is new seems only to be our more explicit and direct interest in the implementation stage of the policy process and our willingness to ask hard questions about the actual effectiveness of implementation efforts.

- <u>This pattern of ineffective implementation probably existed before the 1960's because the fundamental factors underlying it are long-standing elements of our political system</u>. These factors include the fragmentation and dispersion of political power which make implementation agreement difficult (federalism, local control, shared power between separate executive and legislative branches and the multiplicity of decision points at all these levels); the separation of policy designers from policy implementers; the annual budget review pressures and biennial or quadrennial election pressures, which create demands for instant results and counterproductive implementation decisions, e.g. (selecting programs that can be processed in the shortest time); vague standards which make implementation difficult but which are almost endemic because legislators rarely can agree on more precision and specificity and so they pass the problem on to the implementation stage.

But it should be emphasized that these factors which seem to underlie ineffective implementation involve significant dilemmas. These factors are valued characteristics of our political system. The behavior which often is associated with ineffective implementation is legitimate. Indeed, it is purposive rather than aberrant or pathological behavior. The actors who pursue this behavior are trying to achieve values that are widely accepted in our political culture. However, this involves significant dilemmas because at the same time these actions tend to contribute to ineffective implementation.

Some of the dilemmas associated with the factors just noted include the fact that the fragmentation of power in the form of federalism (and especially local control) is widely valued despite the fact that it makes implementation difficult. Separate executive and legislative branches seem to lead to many inefficiencies, especially at the implementation stage. But they are considered by many to contribute to sustaining democracy, pluralism, and many efficiencies such as providing a pattern of policy oversight that helps to detect and correct policy errors. Separation of policy design from implementation may cause difficulties but it also gives policy designers the freedom and incentive to innovate. The short run pressures of elections and budget reviews indicate the tension between the need for electoral control over political leaders within short periods and the much longer period required for policy fruition.

(V) THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE NINE PROGRAMS

The complete details of the degree to which these nine programs satisfied our three criteria for effective implementation are in Appendix B which contains the nine complete case studies, preceded by the abstracts of these case studies in Appendix A. Summaries of the cases are presented here roughly in the order of each program's effectiveness of implementation (ranked by quartiles). There are no exact rankings because the nature of the data does not lend itself to such precision.

- Very Effective Implementation: Pittsburgh's STAY, New Haven's VICI
- Highly Effective Implementation: Portland's EHR, Syracuse's BOCES-Hancock, Albuquerque's THE program
- Medium Effective Implementation: Albuquerque's WORP program, Newark's IHS
- Borderline Effective Implementation: Baltimore's YouthWorks, San Antonio's YCCIP

We found that all nine programs were effectively implemented and these rankings* indicate their varying degree of effective implementation. This variation is significant because it seems to be associated with the presence or absence of some of the conditions that we found to contribute to effective implementation of YEDPA. (Most of these conditions tend to be present in the programs which were most effectively implemented and some of the conditions were missing from some of the programs that were not as effectively implemented.)

These programs are reviewed in terms of our three criteria for effective implementation: (1) minimizing delay; (2) minimizing financial costs; (3) meeting objectives. (Each summary begins with a brief description of the program.)

These summaries are not evaluations of these programs. Such evaluations would include analyses of the programs' ultimate outcomes (the programs' effect on the target population) as well as the effectiveness of their implementation. For the reasons detailed in the section (VIII) of this introduction, we cannot fully analyze these ultimate outcomes at this time.

These analyses are based on the programs' operation through May 31, 1979.

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*Even these quartile rankings are not exact, and there is an overlap between most programs in contiguous categories. But we are confident in our assessment at the poles: The implementation of the program in San Antonio and Baltimore generally was effective but the implementation of the program in New Haven and Pittsburgh was much more effective, with the implementation of the rest of the programs lying somewhere between those two poles and generally being in the direction of highly effective implementation.

Pittsburgh's STAY

STAY is a YETP program which is operated by the Pittsburgh Public Schools. STAY seeks to introduce economically and educationally disadvantaged, in-school youth to the rewards and rigors of the world of work. STAY consists of work experience, academic instruction about the world of work, and support services. (a) Work experience: an attempt to provide practical job experience for youth who have never worked. (b) Academic instruction: teaches STAY participants what is required of them in the world of work and its rewards for them. (c) Support services: assists the student in dealing with personal problems.

Delay: The program began in February, 1978 (the earliest possible date for a YETP program).

Financial costs: No overruns

Satisfaction of objectives: STAY is a large (500 participants annually) program that takes the poorest and most academically disadvantaged youth. It is highly effective in recruiting the target population which must meet the most stringent eligibility requirements of the nine programs analyzed. YETP allows participants to have a family income of up to 85 percent of DOL's lower living standard. But STAY's requirement is more stringent--a family income not higher than 70 percent of DOL's lower living standard. STAY also introduced the requirement of having a two-year academic average below a "C".

Job experience is crucial to the success of such a program, and job development is a very difficult task for these programs to achieve. STAY has been highly effective in developing a large number (approximately 35) of high

quality public sector job sites* which must meet the following two criteria: (a) there is a job for the student to do; (b) the student is well supervised.**

For the first fall semester (the only one for which data are now available) 65 percent of participants completed the program (152 of the 231 initial enrollees). And 47 percent (72 of the 152) of them got private sector jobs within three months of program completion.

New Haven's VICI

New Haven's VICI began in October of 1978. It is funded through the Corporation for Public and Private Ventures (CPPV). Its design was modeled after Emergency Home Repair, a pre-YEDPA program in Portland, Oregon. It enrolls approximately 55 out-of-school youth to perform rehab and weatherization on private, owner-occupied homes in low-income neighborhoods. The worksites and the supplies are provided by five city agencies. Supervisors are union carpenters and painters, who instruct as well.

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*When he developed the program, STAY's director, Fred Monaco, decided that it should have exclusive use of the 35 or so best public sector job sites developed over the years by its predecessors, the SET/AVERT programs. (As we will detail below, SET/AVERT are programs in the Pittsburgh public schools begun in 1971 by Fred Monaco and designed to provide low-income in-school youth permanent part-time employment. STAY was designed to deal with the types of youths who dropped out of SET/AVERT.) Monaco reasoned that since the participants of the STAY program faced multiple barriers to employment, in order for the program to work at all, the work experience component of STAY would have to be of high quality.

**STAY students work in hospital dietary sections, school custodial jobs, the YMCA recreation department. Unlike "THE" in Albuquerque, STAY neither expects nor hopes that students will be hired by these agencies. The aim of STAY is to take students who have never worked and who would probably have dropped out of the SET/AVERT program and let them experience the world of work. Those who successfully complete STAY are channeled into SET/AVERT and access to higher quality jobs with future employment possibilities.

Delay: The program began two weeks after RDOL (Boston) signed the contract in September.*

Financial Costs: No overruns. But because of slight underenrollment in the program (see below), there has been slight underspending on both participant wages and the administrative component.

Satisfaction of objectives: Minor problems in the skill training component were remedied through effective error detection and swift error correction: there was initial overemphasis on achieving job productivity through many small jobs which could be completed quickly. But this offered participants a lesser menu of skill experiences. The program director shifted the policy to larger worksites which offered a broader variety of skill experience. Under both the small and large job site policies, the program's community improvement objective also has been effectively achieved.

Post-program placement in apprenticeship programs initially did not meet projections because of factors beyond the program's control--New Haven's tight labor market. While still making union placements, the program has coped with this by also successfully focusing on non-union placements.

It also should be noted that the New Haven VICI program is one that the general implementation literature (summarized above) would predict would be implemented ineffectively: First, though there were significant design inputs made by the locals, this program was essentially a national design (based on the very different context of Portland, Oregon) being brought to a locality. The literature suggests that this generally makes implementation difficult. Second, as both the "Analysis and Recommendation" section and Appendix B will indicate, the New Haven program also faced more than an average amount of potential implementation difficulties. Given this background, the program's effective implementation is all the more significant.

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*This was three months after New Haven's proposal had been approved by CPPV. But New Haven experienced less delay than five of the eight VICI programs administered by CPPV; the other two experienced only two weeks less delay than New Haven.

Portland's EHR (Emergency Home Repair)

EHR is a work experience program serving in-school and out-of-school youth. Begun in 1974, the program has since become a YETP program combining funds from DOL, HUD, the school district and the city. The program is contracted out to the Portland Public Schools who hire personnel, recruit in-school youth, and provide a headquarters. Supportive services and recruitment of out-of-school youth is done by the city through CETA. The program receives its worksites and supplies from the Portland Development Commission (private owner-occupied homes of the poor, handicapped and elderly). Youths perform emergency rehab under the supervision of public school teachers with construction backgrounds.

Delay: The program began less than one month after the proposal was accepted.*

Financial costs: No overruns on an annual budget of $400,000 (including in-kind services of school district and city personnel).

Satisfaction of objectives: EHR's projected enrollment has been achieved (an average of 38 of the 40 projected youths) through strong decentralized recruitment procedures (each high school has its own work experience coordinator who refers youth to this and other programs). But the absence of any screening standards for referrals resulted in a very high participant turnover rate. This was later remedied by the personal interviewing of each applicant by the program director which resulted in an almost 70 percent reduction in participant turnover. The target of economically disadvantaged youth has been achieved. But in contrast to Pittsburgh, EHR has used the higher standard (family income under 85 percent of the DOL lower living standard). The community improvement objective has also been satisfied.

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*Several months later the program closed down while the agreement with the school district was being finalized. But it only took three weeks to start it up again.

EHR had significant administrative difficulties in its early stages. But even in the short run they had little effect on program participants. (This contrasts with San Antonio and Baltimore where similar difficulties did adversely affect participants in the short run.) Moreover, these difficulties were overcome relatively soon, which is one of the characteristics of effective implementation. EHR has been operating long enough to obtain placement data. Last year the program had a positive termination rate of 60 percent with approximately half going into unsubsidized employment and the other half obtaining further training outside the program.

The noteworthy aspect of the potential difficulties facing the Portland program is that when it began (in its pre-YEDPA stage), it was a completely new and rather innovative idea. Again, on this basis one would predict ineffective implementation, yet EHR was highly effective.

Syracuse's BOCES-Hancock

This YETP formula-funded program serving out-of-school youth, which began in November, 1978, under agreements between the City of Syracuse (Office of Federal and State Aid Coordinator - OFSAC), the Air National Guard (ANG), and the Board of Cooperative Educational Services (BOCES) with an enrollment of 20-25 youths, is conducted at the National Guard quarters of the Hancock Air Force Base. The youths receive on-the-job training in a wide variety of fields, under the supervision of Guardsmen, and remedial reading instruction from a BOCES teacher.

Delay: The program began within two weeks of initial target date.

Financial Costs: No overruns. Indeed, this is a very low cost program. Many youth programs with a skills training component receive free worksites, but they have to purchase supplies and materials and pay supervisors' salaries. By contrast, the Syracuse prime sponsor (the city government through

its Office of Federal and State Aid Coordinator OFSAC) negotiated an agreement with a state agency, the Air National Guard, to secure all of these elements (including skilled technicians as supervisors) at no costs. The only costs to the prime sponsor are a classroom component ($21,000 annually) and participants' wages.

Satisfaction of objectives: The program has not had any problems recruiting low income and minority youth. But with an enrollment of 20-25, it has never reached its target of 30 participants. Placement data were not available because the program is still in its first term. But impressionistic evidence indicates that the implementation of the OJT skills component has gone well. The remedial education component met resistance from the participants, most of whom believe that they do not need it because they are high school graduates. However, adjustments in this curriculum have reduced this resistance.

Just as major potential difficulties faced the New Haven program, it should be noted that the opposite was true for this program: For instance, its objectives are modest--a small program (for a maximum of 30 participants) aimed at a group with better-than-average educational credentials--high school graduates.

Albuquerque's THE Program

THE is a YETP operation run by the Albuquerque Public Schools (APS). Serving in-school youth, THE consists of (a) Job experience: participants in the program are placed in one of five Albuquerque hotels and given hands-on instruction in each of five areas of the hotel operation. (b) Academic instructruction: students attend twice weekly classes dealing with the requirements, rewards, and problems of the world of work. (c) Support services: help students deal with personal problems.

Delay: The program began in February 1978 (the earliest possible date for a YETP program).

Financial costs: No overruns. In fact, despite initial difficulties over negotiations with the hotels over their training fee (see below), two of the six hotels never billed the program at all.

Satisfaction of objectives: THE has achieved over 95 percent of its target 90 participants. It did this by overcoming initial recruitment difficulties (the necessity of the counselor making several trips to each guidance counselor to explain and sell the program). It has also achieved the target of family income no higher than 85 percent of the DOL lower living standard, which required a waiver by the prime sponsor because the prime's initial target was the 70 percent level.

But THE has not been effective in the recruitment of academically disadvantaged youths--potential dropouts. It has no specific recruitment system for this and no entrance requirement such as Pittsburgh's of a below C academic average. The training objective is very effectively achieved. THE provides some of the most significant training of the nine programs analyzed because relatively rapid advancement is possible in the hotel industry, especially in Albuquerque where it is strong and growing. THE's initial placement record of 80 percent was strong but the following semester it dropped to between 40 and 50 percent.*

MEDIUM EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION

Albuquerque's WORP

As a (Tier II) Entitlement program, WORP "entitles" any eligible youth living in a geographically defined areas to a part time job during the school year and a full time job during the summer as long as the youth remains in school. Participants can also earn credit toward graduation by en-

*This may be due to seasonal employment fluctuations in the hotel industry and the director's contention that THE began to attract more disadvantaged participants.

rolling in WORP (listed in the school catalogue as an elective). Once eligibility is certified, youths are assigned a WORP counselor who informs them of their rights and responsibilities and helps them select a job from WORP's available pool.

Delay: The program experienced modest but troublesome delay receiving the grant award. Thus, the program had to begin after the start of the school semester which heightened the pressure to enroll youths rapidly and move them on to worksites. But the main significance of this delay for the issue of effective implementation is that the program was able to effectively gain the school system's cooperation in making the adjustments to the late start-up date which was out of phase with the school calendar.

Financial costs: No overruns. Moreover, the program has been able to allocate more than the required amount on participant wages (77 percent of the total budget) because of its ability to obtain worksite supervisors at no cost to the program.*

Satisfaction of objectives: The program has reached 80 percent of its projected enrollment. But it has not been effective in reaching school dropouts. The initial target was that 10 percent of entitlement eligible youths would be dropouts, but the program has only enrolled 5 percent. (Baltimore, by contrast, has achieved its target of enrolling dropouts to the level of 20 percent of its total enrollment.) Unlike most entitlement programs, WORP has been successful, however, in gaining the award of academic credit for work experience. But it has not achieved the YIEPP objective of job development in the private sector, which is significant both materially and symbolically for YIEPP. WORP's two worksites--the University of New Mexico and Kirtland Air Force Base--have several advantages which will will discuss below. Nevertheless, they do not offer private sector experience or direct future placement.

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*This also permits the program to pay counselors according to the public school salary schedules without the strain on other portions of the administrative budget experienced in other YEDPA programs.

Newark's Independence High School (IHS)

IHS is a private, non-profit, alternative school which seeks to integrate its academic curriculum with practical work experience in order to assist academically, socially, and economically disadvantaged youth. The student alternates between nine weeks of academic instruction with heavy emphasis on reading and math and nine weeks of work in an area of employment in which the student has expressed some interest. In addition to work experience and academic instruction, IHS also has a social service department for aid with personal problems.

Delay: The program began on time at the start of the school year. IHS was awarded its $100,000 grant by DOL in August 1978. But because of conflicts with the prime sponsor (detailed below), the contract was not signed until October 1 and funds were not received until the end of October. IHS's intensely dedicated staff went for over a month without pay in order to have the program begin on time.

Financial costs: The original grant was increased by $56,000 to solve a problem with the program's work experience component. It should be noted, however, that IHS was willing to forego this increase and operate the program differently. It received the money at DOL's insistence.

Satisfaction of objectives: Recruitment is not a problem at IHS. It has a waiting list of 250 youths for 100 positions. It has also achieved its target of youths with previous difficulties both in and out of school: Over half of the student body were expelled or dropped out of a previous high school and almost half have arrest records.

IHS was not able to meet DOL family income qualifications and had to receive a waiver from the prime sponsor which involved a fair amount of conflict

between IHS and the prime.* Satisfying objectives of overall implementation progress, IHS was able to resolve the conflict in its own favor and with only a small amount of delay. But the fact remains that the family income objective was underachieved by quite a bit since the waiver for IHS allowed it to go beyond not only the 70 percent level (the initial target) but also the 85 percent level. Similar conflicts between IHS and the prime sponsor and IHS and DOL characterized several elements of the implementation process. But unlike the one over income eligibility these did not result in any other substantial underachievement of objectives. But there was a good deal of bureaucratic implementation difficulty with which IHS was only moderately adept at handling. However, as in the Portland case, with a minor exception these difficulties in Newark have not yet adversely affected the participants or the substance of the program.

IHS has had some small problems in retaining all of its private sector employers because of DOL's successful insistence that these employers would have to fulfill DOL requirements and pay one-half of the wage bill.**

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*In its initial proposal IHS had agreed to serve only students whose family income was 70 percent of the lower living standard. However, the subsequent income verification found there were a number of students at IHS whose family income was as high as 85 percent of the lower living standard. The prime told IHS to take these students off the work experience component and that the prime would no longer pay for them. After several weeks of conflict and negotiation, IHS received a waiver to go beyond not only the 70 percent level but also the 85 percent level.

**IHS's initial proposal had stipulated that in their YETP program they would continue their tradition of having the youths paid either no wages for their work experience component or wages below the minimum wage. IHS initially rejected DOL's insistence on both paying the minimum wage and the employers paying one-half of the wage bill. They said that this conflicted with the school's image as an innovative educational experience rather than an employment agency and that it would cause the school to lose all of its private sector employers. Months of pre- and post-proposal negotiations resulted in IHS acquiescence to the DOL requirement and DOL's increasing the grant by $56,000 to cover this element.

The academic instruction component has been implemented effectively and is well integrated with the work experience component. Average school attendance is approximately 80 percent and average job attendance is 90 percent. The separate Career Development Seminar, which is designed to explore issues surrounding the world of work, has not been effective. It requires the type of adaptations that were made in a similar class in Pittsburgh's STAY program. But unlike Pittsburgh, these have not been implemented as yet at IHS.

Unlike most of the other programs, the ultimate goal at IHS is graduation from the school rather than simply job placement. After only one year of the YETP program there are insufficient data on its possible effect on the school's dropout rate or post-graduation job placement.

BORDERLINE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION

Baltimore's YouthWorks

This is a YIEPP (Entitlement) program placing 7,000 youths in part time jobs during the school year and full time jobs during the summer so long as the participant remains in school. The majority of the youth (over 80%) are placed in either public sector or private non-profit jobs. The remaining 10% are placed in private sector jobs with most of these placements coming from small "ma and pa" businesses rather than larger, corporate operations.

Delay: The program was only moderately successful in avoiding delay. Placement of enrollees in jobs was delayed by the program's inability to cope with the very large initial volume and subsequent continuous enrollments. After one month of operation, 6,000 youths had been enrolled but only 35 percent of them had received assignments. Six months later this figure had been increased to 83 percent. But this compares to a 99 percent job assignment rate in Albuquerque's entitlement program (though the latter is the highest rate for any entitlement program). These delays in Baltimore were reduced by eventually replacing the continuous enrollments with a monthly assignment system. The programmatic and organizational difficulties, which will be noted shortly, occurred so early in Baltimore that they further contributed to implementation delay.

Financial costs: To remain within its budget, YouthWorks had to negotiate an increase (from approximately $3 million in the first 18 months to $5 million for its one year extension period) in DOL funding to pay additional staff necessitated by implementation difficulties and the elimination of PSEs from direct service delivery positions. Furthermore, another element of the financial costs was only held to a reasonable level because MDRC made a special adjustment for YouthWorks.*

Satisfaction of Objectives: The program has been generally successful in meeting its projected enrollment levels. One month after the program began, in March 1978, 6,000 youths (99 percent of projections) were enrolled. Enrollment levels held at between 80 to 85 percent of projections in the first summer and rose to 95 percent in the fall. Twenty percent of its enrollees are dropouts, which is much greater than Albuquerque's 5 percent. YouthWorks has met its target of placing 10 percent of its participants in private sector worksites. However, to meet this goal, the program shifted from its early emphasis on corporate and institutional job development to a focus on "ma and pa" service and retail businesses.** Whether this shift will lessen the program's ability to achieve its goals of meaningful work experience and future job opportunities must await a comparison of placement outcomes between programs which provide work experience in the small business and large corporate sectors.

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*As will be detailed later, after the increased funding for additional staff, YouthWorks would not have been able to remain within the restriction requiring that 65 percent of budget be paid to participants unless YouthWorks was permitted to deduct funds received for "enrichment activities" from its administrative budget in computing those percentages.

**Corporate placements raised problems in terms of perceived displacement of union labor and employer intolerance of youths with poor work habits. The small business sector demonstrated greater willingness to put time and effort into training youths in return for useful free labor. The concern of the prime sponsor, MOMR, that it establish a good relationship with the large-scale business sector in order to meet other organizational goals also seems to have been a factor in this shift.

Breakdowns in the participant payroll system during the first few months of operation created many citizen complaints to the Mayor's Office and MOMR as well as bad press publicity. It is estimated that only between 300 and 600 participants were not paid on time out of a total of 6,000. But this is large in absolute terms and enough to generate a good deal of bad publicity informally and in the media. Also, employers became discouraged when youths assigned to them were not paid.

This triggered a swift response from Marion Pines, MOMR director, and Robert Ivry, MOMR youth services manager. These and other administrative difficulties were detected and overcome through two strenuous reorganization efforts, which is a characteristic of effective implementation. Indeed, these successful detection and correction efforts and the substantive improvements that they created are one of the major reasons that we consider the Baltimore program to be effectively implemented despite its other limitations. Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that these administrative difficulties reduced the effectiveness of the program's implementation because they were relatively numerous, sizable, and they affected the participants in the program. In all these respects they differ from the administrative difficulties in the Portland program. For instance, intake was halted for a month while the reorganization took place. Our conclusions here are confirmed by MDRC's similar findings.*

Finally, in assessing the implementation effectiveness of YouthWorks, its large number of participants and other ambitious goals should be considered as major positive elements.

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*MDRC praises Baltimore's YouthWorks as a leader among Entitlement programs in organization, ability to recruit participants, and absence of conflict between schools and the prime. But MDRC goes on to note that major reorganization was necessitated by the initial inaccurate belief that its summer SPEDY staff could run Entitlement. Among other things, MDRC found that the reorganization caused YouthWorks to halt intake for one month. "The Youth Entitlement Demonstration: An Interim Report in Implementation," MDRC, April 1979.

San Antonio's YCCIP

The Mexican American Unity Council (MAUC) of San Antonio operates a YCCIP which offers training to economically disadvantaged high school dropouts between the ages of 16-19 in the building and construction trades. In addition to on-the-job training, each participant receives two weekly classes in construction techniques and monthly employment and personal counseling sessions. Each participant is offered four hours of academic instruction leading to a GED. Participation in the GED class is voluntary but nearly three-fourths of participants attend. The work done by the participants is confined to a 30-block low income area and consists of weatherization, landscaping and home improvements. The program is run by hispanics and it helps hispanics help their community.

Delay: The program began slowly and experienced several significant delays. It was scheduled to begin in February 1978, and reached its peak enrollment of 100 youths in April. After an initial 50 youths and five supervisors were brought on, the YCCIP ran into trouble in enrolling youths and hiring union supervisors. Slow applicant processing and poor screening delayed progress toward enrollment projections. Youths were admitted to the YCCIP without careful screening. Thus, there was a large number of dropouts because of drug or alcohol abuse or who were picked up by police at job sites for prior offenses or court proceedings. Turnover among newly-hired CETA staff (along with inadequate operation procedures and training) exacerbated these problems. During the spring the program was shut down for three weeks while negotiations with unions concerning pay and working arrangements for journeymen supervisors were concluded. Finally, an agreement on hiring additional union supervisors was not completed until July. Youths could not be admitted until additional supervisors were hired.

Financial costs: n Antonio YCCIP has had problems in meeting its budgetary objectives. During what we will call the program's first phase (prior to its significant reorganization), participant expenditures were below the required

level of 65 percent of the total budget and in fact barely reached the 55 percent level. Difficulties have continued in phase two. As late as March 1979, the program still was $30,000 over its administrative budget. However, recent efforts have raised participant expenditure levels to about 63 percent.

This budgetary imbalance seems to have occurred because MAUC did not anticipate the high cost of union supervision. Throughout this report we will see anticipation as an essential factor in overcoming implementation obstacles. Also, youth absenteeism reduced wage expenditures because youths are only paid for hours worked. There were also cost overruns in the weatherization expenditures. Subsequent improved procedures and careful monitoring have virtually eliminated these overruns.

Satisfaction of objectives: The early stage of the program was marred by administrative confusion and a failure to meet objectives. MAUC's executive director, Juan Patlan, did not respond to signs of trouble with the YCCIP until there was a low HUD ranking of the program. Then, in the Fall of 1978, the program underwent a major reorganization after Patlan used the resources of two top staff people to analyze the YCCIP's difficulties and recommend solutions. YCCIP's first director--an inexperienced former MAUC investment manager--was then replaced by MAUC's youth services coordinator, Maggie Eureste. She was given major administrative support from Patlan and his staff. With this help, she and the new YCCIP staff increased significantly the effectiveness of the program's implementation.

By June 1979, YCCIP had enrolled 98 percent of its projected 257 youths and had long waiting lists for work projects. It also enrolled 93 percent of its target for females (70 youths), a significant accomplishment in a program made up largely of hispanics and focused on the traditionally male building trades.

In phase one, institutional community improvement projects were emphasized at the expense of other project goals. Large, institutional projects were simpler to administer (supplies were provided by the institution) and to schedule

(projects were long-term). However, residential repair, rehabilitation and weatherization objectives had been in YCCIP's design to respond to community needs other than youth job training. Thus YCCIP later discontinued institutional projects and directed its efforts to meeting the original mix of construction goals.

Placements and terminations initially have been close to projected goals. As of June 1979, there was positive termination for 48 percent of participants (85 youths), which was 89 percent of projected goal terminations. Eighteen youths have been placed in union apprenticeships which is within the range of the program's goal of 25 union placements.

Staff recruitment and hiring has been a serious problem, which has not been fully resolved. In addition to problems with CETA staff, turnover among the core professional staff occurred frequently during the program's first phase and personnel problems continue.*

- A final word on the significance of implementation effectiveness of these nine programs. As noted, these are only approximate estimates of their relative implementation effectiveness. We are more confident about the rankings at the poles than any specific ranking between the programs. But these approximations should suffice to indicate the variation among the programs in implementation effectiveness.

- Furthermore, the reader is cautioned to recall that the purpose of our analysis is not to rank these programs. Rather, it is to suggest a model of the various components and processes of a YEDPA program which would contribute to its effective implementation. Analysis of all nine of these programs was useful in this because on the whole all were effectively implemented.

- Finally, we wish to emphasize our conclusion that the ability of these nine YEDPA programs to cope rather effectively with their implementation difficulties represents significant, though incremental, progress for domestic social initiatives.

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*At this time, it is not possible to determine the extent to which continuing personnel problems are the result of decisions made before the program's reorganization. However, it seems likely that reliance on CETA staff is at least partly responsible.

(VI) THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SOCIAL POLICY INFRASTRUCTURE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

We found that the conditions in 1979 surrounding the implementation of YEDPA (and similar domestic programs) seem to be significantly more favorable for effective implementation than they were fifteen or even ten years ago, especially local conditions. Thus, many of our recommendations are more feasible today than in the past. They are based on programs that are more replicable than in the past because these favorable conditions are more widespread now.

(A) As Sar Levitan has argued, actors and designers at both the Federal and local level learned a lot about designing and implementing social policy during the 1960's and 70's (Levitan, 1976).*

- In addition to this learning, in the past fifteen years a rich and developed social policy infrastructure has grown up at the local level.

- The individuals and organizations which comprise this infrastructure are oriented toward innovation and social progress. Many are alumni of Great Society programs and their spin-offs via foundations. Others are alumni of post-Great Society innovative programs of DOL and HUD. The accumulated experiences of these programs have produced a great deal of learning for individuals and organizations.

Many of these persons are still young, but they have learned much from these previous varied experiences. They represent a new class of activist bureaucrats. Organizers is a good functional description of them and likening them to community or labor organizers captures a good deal of their background and personal predilection. However, they play a larger role and their "positioning" is broader: for instance, they are bureaucrats. They are not just inside the "system" and established, they are also government officials.

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*One of Levitan's conclusions is that "new and experimental efforts will usually come up wanting when compared to longstanding programs. A longer time period encompassing the evolution of the more successful approaches, the retrenchment of the less successful, as well as implementation of needed reforms, is required to get an adequate perspective" (The Promise of Greatness, p. 276-277).

- But we wish to stress the organizational rather than personal elements, and this is why we use the word "infrastructure". We also found rich organizational development. These organizations are "established".

These persons have helped to develop numerous community based organizations (CBO's) as well as new public agencies (or special programs within them). These organizations are experienced, effective, and relatively prosperous. They know how to develop monetary and political support.

(B) This growth in local organizational infrastructure has produced complex organizational and personal networks that link persons and organizations and give them overlapping interests. These networks have grown over time and are built on past relationships and trust. All of this greatly facilitates securing joint action and program assembly. They smooth the way for effective implementation.

The development of these networks which now facilitate program assembly is seen in the close cooperative working relationship in Pittsburgh between the assistant director of the Prime Sponsor, Phil Shugar, and Fred Monaco, the director of STAY. During the late 1960's and early 70's, Shugar and Monaco worked together on a regular basis when both were Neighborhood Youth Corps counselors in Pittsburgh.

In Albuquerque, linkage between key actors in each organization was already in place before the development of WORP. OCETA youth program head, Carlos Duran and the APS (Albuquerque Public Schools) OCETA liaison, Jack Kaemper, had first worked together in the Neighborhood Youth Corps in the late 1960's. Romero, the high school principal, had worked with OCETA through the School on Wheels. Contreras, WORP coordinator, had been a participant in an early manpower program and then headed a youth manpower program for the Albuquerque Public Schools. Finally, the mayor of Albuquerque had once headed OCETA. These earlier experiences formed mutual associations which developed a common view on program operation and a tendency to call on one another to deal with routine implementation problems which if unresolved can lead to major failures.

For instance, the delay in receiving the grant award required WORP to begin enrolling students after the start of the school term. But when Romero was informed of the delay, he directed his staff to make the necessary adjustments for this and other program needs.

Similarly, in Portland over several years the exchange of personnel involving several persons between the school district and the prime sponsors has contributed to informal working relationships which have aided implementation. In New Haven, Al Rogers, the assistant director of VICI, had a previous background in construction which provided him with many contacts with the building trades and the work-providing agencies. These lent general creditability to VICI and helped get past many implementation obstacles. For example, this removed much of Jackson's initial skepticism about "another CETA program" and also facilitated the assembly of worksite day-to-day operation (e.g., a willingness to short-circuit the normally time-consuming supply requisition and ordering process).

Before becoming director of MOMR (the Mayor's Office of Manpower Resources) the prime sponsor of Baltimore's YouthWorks, Marion Pines was a key figure in Baltimore's Job Corps demonstration program and a member of the Maryland Health and Welfare Council. There she developed linkages throughout the city and at the federal level which have aided MOMR and YouthWorks, especially in obtaining both federal funding and a sympathetic federal response to the common implementation adjustment and adaptation problems. Similarly, in San Antonio the links with Washington activist network (e.g., with Msgr. Baroni) of Juan Patlan, the executive director of MAUC, both aided it in getting the initial YEDPA grant and in MAUC's relationships with the city government.

(C) Networks have developed that link <u>organizations</u> as well as individuals. The programs in Portland, Syracuse, and San Antonio provide examples of this kind of <u>organizational infrastructure</u> that has developed locally since the 1960's and has contributed to effective YEDPA implementation.

For almost twenty years Portland has had a history of an advisory council which has effectively brought together representatives of labor, industry, the city, and the schools to improve the fit between vocational education councils and industry needs. Equally important for a YEDPA program, the council's latent function has been the creation of what amounts to a supportive infrastructure among these groups for endeavors such as EHR.

The priority status that the prime sponsor in Syracuse, OFSAC, and its director, Ann Michel, have given youth programs such as BOCES-Hancock seems to have aided implementation significantly. OFSAC represents an instance of a more formally developed piece of local infrastructure than in Portland. OFSAC, established in 1970 by Michel, was initially a division of the mayor's office and is now a separate city department. It controls all federal and state funds that Syracuse receives. OFSAC has grown into a very strong local organization because of its ability to obtain new money for the city. Moreover, it has exercised a good deal of budgetary control and demanded overall accountability of its programs, and in turn, has been able to protect several controversial programs.

In San Antonio, the relevant and helpful new infrastructure is in the Hispanic community rather than in municipal institutions. MAUC, the prime sponsor of the YCCIP program, is an influential CDC founded in 1967. MAUC is not dependent on the support of local political institutions for its survival. With the close cooperation of the Roman Catholic parishes in the south and west sides of the city, MAUC has helped the Hispanic community's economic development.

(D) For YEDPA, a good deal of this learning, experience, infrastructure and many outstanding alumni have come directly and indirectly from CETA and earlier manpower programs. YEDPA has benefited greatly from CETA's positive and negative lessons. If there never had been a CETA program (or any of its predecessors such as MDTA and NYC), development and implementation of YEDPA probably would have been slower and less effective; there would have been more learning on the job; there would have been less of what we will describe as an

experienced program manager's ability to anticipate implementation pitfalls and develop ways of avoiding, coping or overcoming them.

For instance, Sally Connolly, the director of New Haven's VICI, had previously had a good deal of experience administering CETA programs in New Haven. Several of her successful implementations that are described below seem to have been developed from her previous experience. Similarly, Joan Coria, the official director of the Syracuse program, previously had a good deal of experience in SYS (Syracuse Youth Services). The program's de facto director, Lt. Jones, had been co-director of a youth employment program of the Syracuse Housing Authority in the early 1970's. The Hancock Base itself was no newcomer to youth programs. SYS had used the Base as a worksite in a previous similar program.

(E) These organizations and individuals have not used this experience, knowledge, and networks to become conservative. They have used it to become more innovative. Though these organizations and individuals are established, they are not "establishment". They continue to seek new programs, new solutions, and are open to experiment and change.

For instance, Phil Shugar of the Pittsburgh prime sponsor, is close to the director of STAY, Fred Monaco. Nevertheless, he feels from the prime sponsor's perspective, that STAY is a good program, but it is not perfect and needs to improve (especially in supportive services and better targeting). He is also determined that STAY avoid what he considers the serious mistake of resting on its laurels. Similarly, Betty Lou Snapp of the Albuquerque Public Schools (APS) is not satisfied with the status quo. After developing the THE program with YETP money, she now urges APS to take over THE so that YETP money can be used to fund other demonstration projects. She is now planning a program to take advantage of the current construction boom in Albuquerque by teaching students newer construction occupations (e.g., air conditioning installation).

(F) The development of this local infrastructure and local networks that smooth the way for effective implementation represents a major change from the pattern described in the implementation literature on programs of the 1960's and early

1970's. A common theme in those studies was the implementation difficulties caused by local actors. At worst local actors were found to resist innovative federal designs and programs. At best, even when they sought to aid implementation, local actors were found to be lacking in sufficient resources and/or abilities to make it work.

- By contrast, our finding of these local infrastructures and networks means that local conditions and actors now tend to provide an extra boost to the implementation of federal designs and programs rather than an obstacle.

(VII) YEDPA'S EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION IN A VARIETY OF SETTINGS

- We found that within the pattern of effective implementation of these nine programs there is a good deal of programmatic, geographic, and socio-economic variation.

It occurred in different types of YEDPA programs and in different types of cities. The nine include two YIEPP programs (a Tier 1 and a Tier 2), two YCCIP programs, and five YETP programs. The nine include some cities that are large (Baltimore, San Antonio, Pittsburgh), medium (Newark, Portland, Syracuse), and medium to small (Albuquerque and New Haven). There are some eastern, western and southwestern cities; there is a city with a small minority population (Portland), and cities with high minority populations (Newark, San Antonio and Baltimore), and even variation within that category (black and hispanic). One has a relatively large middle income population (Portland), and others have large low income populations (Newark, San Antonio). And finally, there is a good deal of difference in the economic bases of these cities. Of course, all of this is no accident. One of the goals of our program selection was to produce these variations.

The nature of our data and analysis is such, of course, that no systematic conclusions or even tests can be performed because of this variation.*

*Indeed, while there is significant variation in these categories, even if the nature of the data and analysis were more systematic, there are not enough cases in each category to permit significant testing.

- However, effective implementation of YEDPA in such a variety of settings is significant because it gives a rough indication that the possibilities of effectiveness are not limited to any one type of program or city. It also generates a broad base of data, albeit largely impressionistic.

(VIII) WHAT THIS REPORT DOES AND DOES NOT DO

We can tell the Task Force much about--

- How to improve the implementation of these programs
- How to avoid implementation failures

For the reasons noted below, we cannot tell the Task Force with full confidence how to produce ultimately effective outcomes from youth employment programs.

We analyzed the effectiveness of the implementation of these nine programs, but not their ultimate outcomes. Of course, our ultimate goal is a policy that has effective outcomes: one whose effect on the target population is positive; one that tends to ameliorate that social problem in response to which it was created, or at least creates some positive change in it. To achieve this goal, in addition to being adopted effectively and then implemented effectively, it must be first a good policy, with a design appropriate to the problem. As Pressman and Wildavsky have argued, "A fast train is worse than a slow one if it takes you in the wrong direction." (Pressmen and Wildavsky, 1973) Or as Bardach suggests, "'Good' implementation cannot by itself offset the ill effects of a 'bad' policy design any more than a more perfect compass and straight edge can help us square the circle." (Bardach, 1977)

- Thus, effective implementation is a necessary element to achieve an effective outcome, but it is not sufficient in itself.

Why then does this study focus almost exclusively on the element of implementation? First, to analyze the conditions and factors associated with effective outcomes, we must be able to measure the outcomes (the effects of the

program on its participants). However, these nine YEDPA programs are so relatively new that there as yet has not been enough time for the program to have measurable effects on a large number of participants. (All had been in their YEDPA operation less than eighteen months at the time of this study, June 1979). But on the whole, these nine YEDPA programs have been implemented more rapidly than usually is the case for most social programs. Thus, placement data (one indicator of outcomes) are scarce as yet. Moreover, simple placement data do not in themselves yield definitive conclusions about outcomes. They are shaped or "contaminated" by factors other than program effectiveness. These other factors especially include the tightness of the local labor market and other environmental factors. For instance, even in the absence of training programs, youths constantly are moving in and out of the labor market. Thus, without control groups it is difficult to definitively attribute how much of the placement rate is a function of the program and how much would have occurred in its absence.*

In focusing almost exclusively on implementation, we are able to say less than we would like to. But we are interested in action rather than pure social science and thus reject the alternative of saying more, but have to wait to do so until the outcomes are fully discernible and measurable. Because of this goal of action we cannot afford the luxury of applying only the highest methodological standards. Confronted with research ambiguities, the policy analyst cannot afford to remain agnostic and passive in the face of pressing social problems. (In our first recommendation below we will discuss further this tension as described in Hargrove's research on how DOL tried to deal with it in the previous administration.)

o Second, of the three major elements required for an effective outcome--

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*Even if it were not contaminated in this way, outcome data that is currently collected by those monitoring YEDPA programs for DOL often tends not to be useful. For example, MDRC's data on "Reasons for Termination of YIEPP Youth" does not permit distinctions between positive and negative termination. Instead as a single category of analysis it identifies terminations due to youth having "graduated or dropped out" (emphasis added). Similarly, MDRC presents another category labeled "voluntary resignations" without explaining whether this might tend more to be positive or negative. "Monthly Statistical Summary of Youth Entitlement Demonstration". May 1979, Table Q-4.

an effective design, effective adoption, and effective implementation--presently the most difficult one to achieve is effective implementation.

It is the element on which domestic social policies most frequently founder. Indeed, in the past decade or so, problems at the implementation stage have been the largest source of social policy failures and this is predictable. When implementation depends on many actors, as it must in our heterogeneous society and pluralistic political system, there are numerous possibilities for disagreement and delay.

Tables 1-15 illustrate how this pattern applies to YEDPA. They indicate how the multiplicity of participants and perspectives in a YEDPA program combine to produce a formidable obstacle course of policy implementation.

- In short, these obstacles to effective implementation are generic to social policymaking in the U.S. rather than limited to youth employment programs. This is the lesson of the broad range of case studies which we reviewed from outside this area.

There is a table for each of the nine programs. Each table lists the major decision points that determined the course of the program and had to be passed in order for the program to continue. The participants in each decision are also listed. For simplicity we make the admittedly unrealistic assumption that each decision point is independent of each other. Table A summarizes all nine programs.

TABLE A

POINTS OF DECISION AND CLEARANCE NECESSARY FOR COMPLETION OF EACH OF THE NINE YEDPA PROGRAMS: THE MULTIPLICITY OF PARTICIPANTS, PERSPECTIVES, AND AGREEMENTS THAT SHAPED THE COURSE OF EACH PROGRAM.

Program	Decision Points	Participants	Cumulative Total of Agreement
Pittsburgh's STAY	10	39	50
New Haven's VICI	19	22	72
Portland's EHR	15	13	31
Syracuse's BOCES-HANCOCK	13	12	46
Albuquerque's THE	11	98	119
Albuquerque's WORP	8	6	23
Newark's IHS	12	20	33
Baltimore's YouthWorks	15	408	446
San Antonio's YCCIP	9	13	22

TABLE 1

PITTSBURGH

Organizations

Student Training and Assistance for Youth (STAY)

Select Employment Trainee (SET)

Alternative Vocational Education Readiness Training (AVERT)

Actors	Title/Position
Fred Monaco	Project Coordinator of Student Placement Section Director of Project STAY
Phil Shugar	Prime Sponsor
William Bowes	Assistant Director of STAY

TABLE 2

Points of Decision and Clearance Necessary for Pittsburgh's STAY

Decision Points	Participants	Cumulative Total of Agreement
1. Request for proposal sent out by the Prime Sponsor to organizations interested in a YETP for in-school youth. (Fall of 1977)	Phil Shugar	1
2. Proposal returned to the Prime by Monaco of Pittsburgh Public Schools. (Fall of 1977)	Monaco	2
3. Proposal accepted by the Prime in principle but with a number of reservations. Prime wants to negotiate the proposed salary of FSA's, the eligibility requirements of participants, and the student-staff ratio. (Fall of 1977)	Monaco/Shugar	4
4. Negotations are held between Prime and schools over the issues detailed above. At the end of the negotations, the scorecard reads: salary settled in favor of schools, eligibility requirements and student-staff ratio settled in favor of Prime. (Fall of 1977)	Monaco/Shugar	7
5. Project STAY is given final approval by the Prime. (December 1977)	Shugar	8
6. Monaco hires an assistant program operator and 13 Field Service Aides. (January 1978)	Monaco/Bowes	10
7. Thirty-five public sector worksites are contacted and enrolled in Project STAY. (January 1978)	Monaco & 35 worksites	46
8. Recruitment begins for STAY. The recruitment is conducted by the FSA's and after some initial difficulties, 250 youths are enrolled. (February 1978)	FSA's	47

Table 2 (cont.)

Decision Points	Participants	Cumulative Total of Agreements
9. As the program nears its final weeks of its first semester, Monaco contacts the 13 FSA's from SET/AVERT and asks them to give the highest priority to the graduates of STAY in their (SET/AVERT FSA's) job placement efforts. (April 1978)	Monaco	48
10. As the problems with the STAY become more severe, Monaco decides to hire a full-time curriculum developer. This necessitates negotiations with the Prime. (June 1978)	Monaco/Shugar	50

TABLE 3

New Haven

Organizations

Corporation for Public & Private Ventures (CPPV)
CETA (Prime Sponsor)
Carpenters Union
Painters Union

Human Resources Administration (HRA)
Neighborhood Preservation (NP)
New Haven Redevelopment Agency
Regional Rehab. Institute (RRI)
Neighborhood Housing Inc. (NHI)
} Work Providers

Regional Office — Department of Labor (R/DOL)

Actors	Title/Position
Tom Corso	CETA Director
Tom Peterson	Planner in CETA
Sally Connolly	Program Director for Ventures
Al Rogers	Assistant Director for Ventures
Lou D'Antonio	Budget Department - CETA
Sal Monarco	Carpenters Union Representative
David Saldibar	Carpenters Union - Business Manager
Frank Perelli	Business Rep. of Painter's Union
Tom Laugeni	Vice President of Painting & Decorating Contractors of America
Ed White	Executive Director - New Haven Housing Authority
George Musgrove	Human Resources Administrator
Stephen Darley	Executive Director - Neighborhood Housing, Inc.
Mike Catania	Deputy Director - New Haven Redevelopment Agency
Robert Jackson	Office of Neighborhood Preservation
Stephen Whetstone	Director - Regional Rehab Institute
Pat Tisi	Energy Coordinator in Regional Rehab Institute
Gerald Tirozzi	Superintendent of Schools
Mark Barbarino	Director of Adult Education
John Kelly	CPPV Representative
Lane Smith	CPPV Representative
David Newton	Counselor - Ventures
Judy Andrews	Counselor - Ventures

TABLE 4

Points of Decision and Clearance Necessary for New Haven's VICI Program

Decision Points	Participants	Cumulative Total of Agreements
1. Selection in New Haven of people to write proposal (Corso wanted people that he trusted and knew would do the best job possible). (May 1978)	Corso, Connolly Peterson, DiAntonio	3
2. Negotiation with Central Connecticut carpenters, Local Union No. 24. (May-June 1978)	Saldibar (union), Connolly	8
a) Unions would establish criteria for worksites;		
b) Union would provide safety instruction;		
c) Union personnel would be hired as crew chiefs;		
d) Program would not take work away from union;		
e) Union would provide criteria for training program;		
f) Advisory Council would be established including representative of union and council would have access to all records and reports;		
g) Union representative could sit on interviewing/hiring committee.	Connolly, Saldibar, Peterson, Corso (involved in decision re: hiring committee)	
3. Negotiations with brotherhood of painters and Allied Trades of America Local Union No. 186. (May-June 1978)	Connolly, Perrelli	11

Table 4 (cont.)

Decision Points	Participants	Cumulative Total of Agreements
a) Agree to sit on Advisory Council;		
b) Agree to give preference to ventures graduates for apprenticeship openings;		
c) Program would not conflict with labor or union policy.		
4. Negotiations with Painting and Decorating Contractors of America. (May-June 1978)	Connolly, Laugeni	16
a) Unions would establish criteria for worksites;		
b) Union personnel would be hired as crew chiefs;		
c) Program would not take work away from union;		
d) Agree to sit on Advisory Council.		
5. Negotiations with Housing Authority. (May-June 1978)	Peterson, White	20
a) Housing authority would provide worksites to program;		
b) Projects must be within one of the four target areas;		
c) Projects will represent "non-contractible" work;		
d) Projects must meet community development needs.		
6. Negotiation with Human Resources Administration. (May-June 1978)	Peterson	24
a) HRA would provide at least three projects to program; Prince Street School, Davenport Library and Ivy Street School;		

Table 4 (cont.)

Decision Points	Participants	Cumulative Total of Agreements
b) Projects must be within one of four target areas;		
c) Projects will represent "non-contractible" work, that is, work not ordinarily contracted to unions;		
d) Projects must meet community development needs.		
7. Negotiations with Neighborhood Housing, Inc. (May-June 1978)	Peterson, Darley	28
a) NHI agreed to use at least one crew from the program for rehab. work;		
b) Project must be within one of four target areas;		
c) Projects will represent "non-contractible" work;		
d) Projects must meet community development needs.		
8. Negotiations with New Haven Redevelopment Agency. (May-June 1978)	Peterson, Catania	32
a) NHRA agrees to provide worksites to program;		
b) Project must be within one of four target areas;		
c) Projects will represent "non-contractible" work;		
d) Projects must meet community development needs.		

Table 4 (cont.)

Decision Points	Participants	Cumulative Total of Agreements
9. Negotiations with Office of Neighborhood Preservation. (May-June 1978) a) N.P. agrees to provide worksites on trial basis--if satisfied with quality of work, supply will be increased; b) Project must be within one of four target areas; c) Projects will represent "non-contractible" work; d) Projects must meet community development needs.	Peterson, Jackson	36
10. Negotiations with Regional Rehab Institute. (May-June 1978) a) RRI agrees to supply worksites to program. Work to be done will be weatherization work; b) Project must be within one of four target areas; c) Projects will represent "non-contractible" work; d) Projects must meet community development needs.	Peterson, Whetstone	40
11. Negotiations with New Haven Public Schools. (May-June 1978) a) Agree to supply program with part-time instructor to teach blue print reading and trade-related mathematics; b) Provide GED instructor.	Peterson, Connolly, Corso, Tirozzi (superintendent), Barbarino (Director of Adult Ed.)	42

Table 4 (cont.)

Decision Points	Participants	Cumulative Total of Agreements
12. On-site visit by CPPV Representative. (June 1978) CPPV essentially reiterated most of the agreements made with unions and work-providing agencies. Approximately 38--not included in total because they are not new agreements, merely confirmations of existing agreements.	15 Included CPPV rep. Connolly, Peterson, DiAntonio, Corso and all the Union and Work-Providing Agency reps.	
13. CPPV approves proposal. (June-July 1978)	CPPV rep.	43
14. R/DOL approves--signs contract--money released. (Sept. 1978)	2	45
15. Hiring carpenter crew chiefs. (Summer 1978) a) Saldibar does initial screening within his union; b) Hiring committee then decides out of the applicants--unanimous agreement on all.	Saldibar, rep. from CETA Personnel Office, Rep. from Work-Providing Agency	57
16. Hiring painting crew chiefs. (Summer 1978) a) Laugenni does initial screening within his union; b) Hiring committee then decides--unanimous agreement on all.	Laugenni, rep. from CETA Personnel Office, rep. from Work-Providing Agency	66
17. Selecting Program Director. (Sept. 1978) a) As it turned out, it was a non-decision decision. The procedure consisted of submitting an application for the position. Corso wanted Connolly to run program. Everyone in CETA believed that she would get the job. No one else applied.	Corso, Connolly	68

Table 4 (cont.)

Decision Points	Participants	Cumulative Total of Agreements
18. Hiring Assistant Director. (Oct. 1978) Agreement to increase salary for that position. As it stood originally, assistant director's salary was less than crew chief's salary. (One of the union people (forgot which one) said that director's salary had to be higher. It was agreed.	Laugeni, Saldibar rep. from Work-Providing Agency	70
19. Hiring counselors a) Counselors were referred to program by CETA Personnel Dept. David Newton started before Sally was chosen as director, so the only interview was within CETA. (Aug. 1978); b) Judy Andrews was hired after Sally so she was interviewed both within Personnel Dept. and by Sally. (Oct. 1978)	CETA Personnel Dept.	72

Note: Total (72) does not include preliminary negotiations and decisions at DOL with respect to the VICIC demonstration in general.

TABLE 5

PORTLAND

Organizations

Human Resource Bureau (HRB)
Office of Planning & Development (OPD)
Portland Development Commission (PDC)
City Council
Bureau of Buildings
Associated General Contractors (AGC)
Carpenters Union
School District
Portland Community College (PCC)
CETA

Actors	Title/Postition
Neil Goldschmitt	Mayor of Portland
John Pendergrass	Former Youth Career Training Coordinator
Charles Jordan	Former Director of Human Resource Bureau
Ron Anderson	Head of Associated General Contractors
Don Staudenmeir	Head of Local Carpenters Union
Will Newman	First Program Director of Emergency Home Repair
Don Silvey	Housing Manager in Portland Development Commission
Marv Rasmussen	Director of District Programs, Portland Public Schools
Gary Tuck	Youth Employment Coordinator--Portland Public Schools
Bill Hadley	Operations Specialist--Youth Career Training Division
Bob Olson	Second Program Director
John Ries	Present (3rd) Program Director
Leon Johnson	Former Head of Youth Service Division

TABLE 6

Points of Decision and Clearance Necessary for Portland's Emergency Home Repair Program

Decision Points	Participants	Cumulative Total of Agreements
1. Mayor decides to have youth program. (Summer 1974) Mayor requests that Pendergrass write proposal for youth program.	Mayor, Human Resource Bureau, Pendergrass, (Youth Career Training Office)	1
2. Pendergrass submits proposal to Council. (Summer 1974) Council votes unanimously to accept proposal and all but one councilor vote to pass it on emergency basis. Because of that one vote, funds cannot be dispersed for 30 days.	Mayor, City Council	2
3. Pendergrass lines up staff. (Summer 1974)	Pendergrass	3
4. City Council passes ordinance to waive building permit fees. (Summer 1974) Per ordinance, Bureau of Buildings will issue building permits to EHR crews at no cost.	City Council, Bureau of Buildings	4
5. City Council passes ordinance that Office of Planning and Development will earmark a portion of their HUD community. (Summer 1974) Office of Planning and Development	City Council, OPD, PDC	
6. Charles Jordan (Human Resource Bureau) approaches AGC for their endorsement. (Summer 1974) a) AGC agrees to support program; b) AGC agrees to provide technical assistance; c) Jordan agrees that EHR will not take away work from unions.	Jordan, AGC	9

Table 6 (cont.)

Decision Points	Participants	Cumulative Total of Agreements
7. AGC brings in Carpenters Union. (Summer 1974) a) Carpenters Union agrees to support program; b) Agrees to provide technical assistance; c) Agrees to provide program with union journeymen; d) Agreement that EHR will not perform union work.	AGC, City, Carpenters Union	13
8. Agreement to award academic credit. (Summer 1974) School District agrees to award academic credit to in-school youth who participate in program.	City and School District	14
9. Program Director is hired. (Summer 1974)	City and Director (Newman)	15
10. Agreement with Portland Community College. (Summer 1974) Portland Community College agrees to supply program with a shop teacher.	City and PPC	16
11. Program is contracted out to schools. (Spring 1975) a) School District agrees to run program; b) School District agrees to provide managerial and fiscal support, c) School District agrees to hire and supervise instructor; d) School District agrees to provide building to house program's headquarters.	City (Human Resource Bureau), District School	20

Table 6 (cont.)

Decision Points	Participants	Cumulative Total of Agreements
12. New Director is hired. (Summer 1975) Because of personality conflict between director and youth services personnel, it was decided by City and School District that when school took over program, a new director would be brought in.	City School District, AGC	21
13. Program encounters administrative difficulties resulting in administrative overhaul. (Winter 1977) a) Accountant is hired--establishes fiscal control system; b) Establish formal criteria for job description for program director; c) Old director decides not to apply; d) New director is hired; e) Purchasing is centralized and made responsibility of project coordinator; f) Formal criteria for screening established.	City, School District, AGC	27
14. Replacement of Crew Chiefs. (Winter 1977) a) Tensions created by procedural changes. Attrition and favorable climate for construction led to staff turnover among crew chiefs; b) Carpenters Union was approached for replacement personnel but they had no more to supply; c) School District supplied program with shop teachers to work as crew chiefs.	City, School District, AGC, Carpenters Union	30

Table 6 (cont.)

Decision Points	Participants	Cumulative Total of Agreements
15. Establish a Skills Development curriculum. (Spring/Summer 1979)	Program Director, City, School, Carpenters Union	31
a) All of the actors cited are presently working on a curriculum that will aid in providing participants with the necessary skills of the craft and monitor their progress.		

TABLE 7

Syracuse

Organizations

Air National Guard (ANG)
Syracuse Youth Service (SYS)
Office of Federal & State Aid Coordinator (OFSAC)
Urban League
Board of Cooperative & Educational Services (BOCES)
Regional Office - Department of Labor (R/ROL)

Actors	Title/Position
Ralph Jones	Lieutenant - Air National Guard - Syracuse
Major Purple	Major - Air National Guard - Syracuse
Major Hall	Major - Air National Guard - Syracuse
Andy Willis	Director of Urban League - Syracuse
Lee Best	Director of Syracuse Youth Service
Mike Tierney	Manpower Planning Director in OFSAC
Terry Dolan	Operations Supervisor - Syracuse Youth Service
Joann Coria	Counseling Supervisor - Syracuse Youth Service
Ann Michel	Former Director of Office of Federal and State Aid Coordinator
Jim Brower	Director of Adult Education Services - BOCES
Bettsy Burton	BOCES teacher
Lieutenant Butler	Base's CETA Liason Officer

TABLE 8

Points of Decision and Clearance Necessary for the Implementation of Syracuse's BOCES-Hancock Program

Decision Points	Participants	Cumulative Total of Agreements
1. Decision to have program at Base. (Summer 1978)	Jones, Majors, Hall & Purple	4
2. Attempts to start program with Urban League. (Summer 1978) No agreement - Base would have to pay kids directly and get reimbursed. Base does not have funds.	Jones, Willis (Urban League)	
3. Decision to have program with SYS. (Summer 1978) a) Agree that Base will train kids in various shops at Base; b) Agree that city (SYS) will pay youths; c) Agree that there will be a remedial education component; d) Agree that Base will supply transportation.	Jones, Hall, Purple, Best, Tierney, Dolan Coria	9
4. Ann Michel of OFSAC endorses program. (Summer 1978) Jones brought Ann Michel to Base and showed her a youth who was working in one of the shops. She was very impressed and gave her support for the program.	Michel	10
5. Bringing BOCES into program. (Sept. 1978) BOCES agrees to supply program with teacher and materials for $21,000.	SYS (Dolan) BOCES (Bowen)	12

Table 8 (cont.)

Decision Points	Participants	Cumulative Total of Agreements
6. Hiring teacher (Sept. 1978) BOCES coordinator hires Bettsy Burton, who had just finished working in another BOCES program, to teach youths at Base.	Bowen	13
7. R/DOL approves program (Sept. 1978)	R/DOL	14
8. Majors, Purple and Hall arrange to keep Jones on Base (Fall 1978)	Majors, Purple, Hall	16
9. Recruiting supervisors (Sept. - Oct. 1978) Jones spoke to guardsmen individually to solicit their participation. At least 10 agreed to participate.	Jones and at least 20 other guardsmen	37
10. Jones receives transfer to Washington, D.C. Majors requests that he select a successor (Nov. 1978)	Hall, Purple, Jones	39
11. Jones picks Butler (Nov. 1978) Majors agrees to ask Butler to run program		40
12. Butler is chosen (Nov. 1978) Lt. Butler, who was in Officer's Training School in Tennessee, agreed to run the program.	Hall, Purple, Jones, Butler	44
13. Majors arranges to keep Butler on Base (Nov. 1978) Paperwork is filed to receive additional active duty days for Butler.	Hall, Purple	46

TABLE 9

Albuquerque's THE

Organizations

Tourism Hospitality Education (THE)

Albuquerque Public Schools (APS)

Office of Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (OCETA)

Actors	Title/Position
Bettie Lou Snapp	Assistant of Director of Vocational Education (Home Economics)
Carlos Duran	Youth Coordinator, Office of Comprehensive Employment Training Act (OCETA)
	President of Albuquerque Inkeepers Association
Russ Rutledge	Counselor for THE

TABLE 10

Points of Decision and Clearance Necessary for Albuquerque's THE

Decision Points	Participants	Cumulative Total of Agreements
1. Carlos Duran asks APS to submit a proposal for the 22 percent of YETP money that must be spent in accordance with a signed agreement between LEA and Prime Sponsor.	APS Prime Sponsor	2
2. Bettie Lou Snapp of APS contacts President of Hotel/Motel Association about her "hotel idea".	Snapp, President of Hotel/Motel	4
3. President of Hotel/Motel Association informs Snapp that five full service hotels will participate in her program for a training fee of $10,000 per hotel.	Five hotels, President Snapp	11
4. Snapp submits the plan to the OCETA.	Snapp	12
5. Prime Sponsor likes the proposal in principle but objects rather strenuously to the training fee. Prime Sponsor asks Snapp to renegotiate the training fee.	Prime Sponsor	13
6. Snapp informs the President of the Hotel/Motel Association of the problems with the fee. The President agrees to approach the five hotels about a lower fee.	Snapp, President	15
7. Snapp, President of Hotel/Motel Association and representatives of the five hotels agree on a set figure of $75 a week for the training fee.	Snapp, President 5 hotels	22
8. Prime Sponsor approves the new revised plan and gives the go-ahead for THE.	Prime Sponsor	23
9. Snapp hires the staff for THE consisting of a teacher/administrator and a counselor.	Snapp	24

Table 10 (cont.)

Decision Points	Participants	Cumulative Total of Agreements
10. Rutledge contacts the guidance counselors of the nine high schools participating in THE, explains the program, and asks their help in recruiting participants.	Rutledge & (90) guidance counselors	117
10a. Recruitment is forced to make a return visit to the guidance counselors and reexplain the program to them.	Rutledge & the guidance counselors	118
11. Sixty students are finally enrolled in THE. But in order to do so, THE asks the Prime for permission to allow 15 percent of THE participants with family incomes between 70 and 80 percent of the DOL's lower living standard to enroll in the program. The Prime gives its permission.	Prime, THE	119

TABLE 11

Albuquerque

Organizations

OCETA
APS
WORP
MDRC (Manpower Development Research Corporation)
University of New Mexico
Kirkland Air Force Base

Actors	Title/Position
Carlos Duran	Youth Coordinator for Office of CETA (OCETA)
Jack Kaemper	Albuquerque Public Schools (APS) liaison with OCETA
Dennis Contreras	Director of Work Opportunity Research Program (WORP)

Points of Decision and Clearance Necessary for Albuquerque's WORP

Decision Points	Participants	Cumulative Total of Agreements
1. Preparation of Application for YIEPP grant.	OCETA, APS	2
2. Selection of Entitlement Area.	OCETA, APS, MDRC	5
3. Agreement on worksites at University of New Mexico and Kirkland Air Force Base.	OCETA, APS, UNM, AFB	9
4. Agreement to adjust schedules of entitlement youths.	Contreras, Romero	11
5. Agreement to provide WORP bus.	WORP, Duran, MDRC	14
6. Agreement to include New Futures School in Entitlement Program.	Contreras, Kaemper, Duran	18
7. Agreement to hold GED class at vocational institute.	APS, Contreras	20
8. Agreement to add support service staff.	Contreras, OCETA, MDRC	23

TABLE 12

Newark

Organizations

Independence High School (IHS)

YouthWork, Inc.

Regional Department of Labor (R/DOL)

Mayor's Office of Employment and Training (Prime Sponsor)

Actors	Title/Position
Harry Wheeler	Director: Mayor's Office of Employment and Training
Dan O'Flaherty	Youth Coordinator of Mayor's Office of Employment and Training

TABLE 13

Points of Decision and Clearance Necessary for Newark's IHS

Decision Points	Participants	Cumulative Total of Agreements
1. Prime Sponsor's office informs IHS of the competition being conducted by YouthWork for DOL funding for In-School Exemplary programs to help youth avoid unemployment. Prime asks for proposal.	Prime Sponsor	1
2. IHS submits proposal which is largely a description of the IHS program that was reorganized in 1976.	IHS	2
3. Dan O'Flaherty receives the proposal and tells IHS that he is afraid that IHS would not be funded by YouthWork and that IHS will have difficulty with the work experience part of the program.	O'Flaherty	3
4. IHS is notified by YouthWork that they have qualified for the final competition. Youthwork makes a site visit to IHS.	YouthWork	4
5. IHS is notified that they have been selected by YouthWork to participate in the In-School Exemplary program. IHS receives a grant of $289,000 from Youthwork.	YouthWork	5
6. School opens and after three-week orientation, the student body is divided in half. Approximately 45 students begin academic instruction and 45 begin their work experience. The work experience necessitates placing 45 students in jobs they expressed some interest in. Thus approximately 45 employers must be found for these students.	IHS	6

Table 13 (cont.)

Decision Points	Participants	Cumulative Total of Agreements
7. IHS is contacted by YouthWork and informed that the work experience as presently constituted is illegal. After day-long negotiations involving IHS, YouthWork, Prime Sponsor, DOL, RDOL and Congressman Peter Rodino, IHS agrees to change its work experience which will necessitate asking its private sector employers to pay one-half of the wage bill of students.	IHS, RDOL, DOL, Prime Sponsor, Peter Rodino, YouthWork	12
8. IHS contacts its (approximately) 15 private sector employers and informs them of the change. Surprisingly, 11 agree to the change.	IHS 15 employers	28
9. After eight weeks of working, 45 students return to IHS for eight weeks of academic instruction. Thus, 45 new jobs must be found for the students who were at academic instruction for the preceding eight weeks.	IHS	29
10. IHS is contacted by the Prime Sponsor concerning the eligibility of some students. Prime informs IHS that ineligible students must be removed from DOL supported programs.	Prime	30
11. IHS asks for permission to enroll students with family incomes in excess of 85 percent of DOL's lower living standard. Having read YEDPA regulations, IHS knew that such permission could be granted by DOL if the Prime agreed. The Prime restated its point about removing IHS students from DOL supported activities.	IHS	31
12. IHS demands a meeting with Prime over eligibility issue. Prime insists that YouthWork be present at the meeting. At the meeting Prime accedes to IHS's request if YouthWork has no objections.	IHS, YouthWork, Prime	33

TABLE 14

Baltimore

Organizations

MOMR

Manpower Development Resource Corporation (MDRC)

Baltimore City Schools (BCS)

Actors	Title/Position
Marion Pines	Director of Mayor's Office of Manpower Resources (MOMR)
Robert Ivry	Youth Services Manager of MOMR
William Schaefer	Mayor of Baltimore
Thomas Bradley	AFL-CIO Representative
James Keck	Director of YouthWorks
Henry Snyder	Head of the Ramsey Conference

Decision and Clearance Points Necessary for the Implementation of Baltimore's Entitlement Program

Decision Points	Participants	Cumulative Total of Agreements
1. Preparation of Application for YIEPP grant.	Pines, Ivry, Mayor, BCS, MDRC	4
2. Selection of Baltimore as demonstration site.	MDRC	5
3. Selection of Entitlement Area.	Pines, Mayor, MDRC	8
4. Agreement to subcontract with LEA for alternative education programs and in-school administration.	MOMR	10
5. Agreement to subcontract with CBO's for alternative education.	MOMR, CBO's (3)	14
6. Agreement of AFL-CIO to support the program.	Tom Bradley	15

Table 14 (cont.)

Decision Points	Participation	Cumulative Total of Agreements
7. Agreement to pay wage differential to city employees supervising youth.	MOMR, Civil Service Comm., Labor Comm., Union Rep.	19
8. Agreement of large businesses to provide worksites.	Hank Snyder	20
9. Agreement of smaller businesses to provide worksites.	300 individual businessmen	320
10. Agreement of city department heads to provide worksites.	City department heads (15)	335
11. Agreement of CBO's and non-profit organizations to provide worksites.	Organization heads (100)	435
12. Development of MOMR task force to examine difficulties of YIEPP implementation.	Pines, Ivry	437
13. Reorganization of Entitlement Program.	Pines, Ivry, Keck	440
14. Subsequent reorganizations.	Ivry, Keck	442
15. Elimination of Public Service Employees from service delivery and staff expansion.	Pines, Ivry, Keck, MDRC	446

TABLE 15

San Antonio

Organizations

MAUC
Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
Community Services Agency (CSA)
Neighborhood Housing Services (NHS)
Texas Employment Commission (TEC)
Six Catholic Churches
Building and Trade Unions of San Antonio

Actor	Title/Position
Juan Patlan	Executive Director of Mexican American Unity Council (MAUC)

Decision and Clearance Points Necessary for the Implementation of MAUC YCCIP

Decision Points	Participants	Cumulative Total of Agreements
1. Decision to ask MAUC to submit a proposal to HUD.	HUD	1
2. MAUC decision to apply for HUD grant and preparation of preliminary proposal.	Patlan, MAUC dept. heads, MAUC board	4
3. HUD selection of MAUC for grant award.	HUD	5
4. Agreement to provide worksites for YCCIP.	Churches, local school district, city dept. involved in NHS	8
5. Agreement to provide worksite supervisors. Wage and working conditions approval.	Union representatives (4)	12
6. Union agreement to write letters in support of YCCIP.	Union representatives (6)	18
7. Texas Employment Commission agreement to certify youths.	TEC	19
8. CSA agreement to allow venture capital funds awarded to MAUC's community development department to be used for YCCIP weatherization project.	CSA	20
9. Decision to reorganize YCCIP and hire a new director.	Patlan and MAUC Board	22

COMBINING ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: HOW THESE PROGRAMS WORKED AND "WHAT DO WE DO ON MONDAY?"

The recommendations in this report are empirically grounded. They do not represent our wishful thinking or an effort to engage in broad social theory. Rather they are specifically based on our analysis of these nine YEDPA programs and secondary analysis of earlier studies for OYP.*

Since they are empirically based, these recommendations also should indicate to the reader the actual conditions that we found contributed to effective implementation in these nine. They are, however, written in the format of recommendations rather than as descriptions to make them more useful to the following audiences who want answers to the question: "O.K., this is how those programs worked and why, but what do we do on Monday?"

(1) Program Operators:

(a) as an aid to those who will be initiating new programs;

(b) as an aid to those operating ongoing programs and who seek to reassess and improve them.

(2) Analysts in VPTFYE, DOL and Congress who are drafting:

(a) future youth employment legislation;

(b) technical assistance "how to run programs" guides.

(3) OYP and ETA policymakers who are making allocation decisions:

(a) where and in what type of programs should discretionary funds be put;

(b) what proportion of total funds should be alloted to such discretionary allocations.

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* See references cited above, p.1

OUR RECOMMENDATIONS:

(I) FOCUS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION STAGE

- That YEDPA policy makers, program operators, and everyone in between focus a disproportionate amount of their attention and resources on implementation stage of these programs.

For some, such as OYP under Robert Taggart, this will represent a continuation of their already significant effort at process evaluation. Indeed, this study benefited greatly from the process evaluation studies previously undertaken at the request of OYP. These formed significant building blocks for our analysis.

(A) Of the three major elements required for an effective outcome*--an effective design, effective adoption, and effective implementation--presently the most difficult one to achieve is effective implementation. It is the element on which domestic social policies most frequently founder.

For most of them, the allegedly simple, technical details of implementation cannot be successfully completed. We must start with effective designs for YEDPA programs and we have started with them. But these designs will not be put into practice nor will the policy have an effect on the target population unless it is implemented effectively.

Currently there are many good general ideas for ameliorating social problems, and there are many good specific policy designs. But the legislative successes (the adoption stage) of yesterday have often become the implementation problems of today. Since the mid-1960's it has become much easier for good policy ideas to traverse the adoption stage without major alterations. But many of these good ideas, which in turn become laws, were implemented ineffectively and thus could not create effective outcomes for citizens. Their implementation was either (a) inordinately delayed, or (b) it required expenditures far beyond what was necessary, or (c) there was an alteration and/or underachievement of the policy's objectives; or some combination of the three.

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*By an effective policy outcome we mean a policy whose effect on the target population is positive and tends to ameliorate the social problem in response to which it was created.

Indeed, in the past decade or so, problems at the implementation stage have been the largest source of the type of policy failures that we noted in our description of the New Town In-Town program, the EDA program in Oakland, and California's community mental health services. These failures prevent participants from benefiting from a program and also tend to undermine general political support for such programs. If the implementation stage can avoid such failures, then not only will there be better delivery of policies to citizens but also increased political support for such policies.

- In short, policy designers and administrators can no longer consider implementation as someone else's problem.

Of course, if implementation becomes more effective yet there are weak policy designs, outcomes will remain ineffective. However, there seem to be a sufficient number of good ideas and policy designs around today, especially in the manpower and employment areas.

(B) We also recommend giving more attention to the implementation stage in order to sensitize policymakers, especially those drafting legislation and allocating scarce federal funds, to the essential role of implementation in creating effective outcomes. There is ample evidence that most of the increased lip service paid to implementation in the last few years is just that. The belief that implementation issues are relatively insignificant and are someone else's problem remains firmly grounded in many otherwise astute policymakers and policy analysts for several understandable reasons.

First, as Bardach suggests, "Implementation issues often seem to be of slight practical consequence alongside basic theoretical or political issues like, 'Do we really want to treat heroin use as a crime?' or 'How much should we spend on exploring outer space?' or 'Who should bear the financial burden of national health insurance?' Also, implementation issues tend to come up (when they do come up) toward the end of an analytical process, when professional and political investments in resolutions to more basic issues may already be in place and are very resistant to being disturbed by 'mere' considerations of implementability. People who insist on raising these issues at this stage risk being called small-minded or being accused of defeatism or conspiring with the opposition." (Bardach, 1977)

Second, the recent emphasis on policy evaluation seems to have unwittingly made the analysis of policy implementation seem relatively insignificant. Since the idea of systematic evaluation of policies took root in Washington in the early 1960's, it has contributed much to the improvement of both policy and its analysis. But one of the negative consequences of this otherwise salutary change in outlook is a tendency on the part of some to ask about a program--"Does it work?"and expect primarily a "Yes" or "No" answer.

- In the following sections (especially III-V) we will indicate that programs like YEDPA, which require relatively complex joint action, do not simply "work" or "not work". Even if they have a good design, it takes much effort to make them work. Programs do not get implemented automatically; they have to be put together piece by piece. Certain conditions will impede the working of a program despite its good initial design and other conditions are necessary to put a good design into operation.

- A major goal of this report is to spell out the latter set of conditions in the approximate form of an impressionistic model.

- In some instances, the design of the program itself can create problems for implementation. Even with good local administration, the implementation process may founder on an excessively complex program design. This means that where possible (as in YEDPA) there should be an effort to maintain simple and modest program designs (see section XV). When the program design has become excessively complex and has other problems, actions must be taken in the implementation process to compensate for and repair these design inadequacies. (Section IV and X will detail these actions.)

Erwin Hargrove's just completed study of DOL's efforts under the previous administration to evaluate CETA in 1974-75, indicates both of the above reasons for slighting implementation at work. Among other things, Hargrove found that the economists of ASPER (the office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy, Evaluation and Research) tended to discount the perspective of what Hargrove calls the political and bureaucratic people in the rest of the department. Hargrove found that the ASPER economists wanted, almost to the exclusion of all else, a study that would measure the impact half of the evaluation: what percentage of trainees got and kept good jobs. They were not concerned with what Hargrove calls the process half of the question: the factors that

explained why some cities' programs were working better than others. The reason, Hargrove reports, is that while the first task was suitable to their quantitative economic models, the latter was not. "Their methods, as econometricians, did not permit them to easily suggest how to link process data to findings about impact. . . . Therefore, their energies went into safeguarding the methodological correctness of the plan."(Hargrove, 1979)

(II) IMPLEMENTATION: COMPLEX PROGRAM ASSEMBLY AND A PROCESS OF AVOIDING PITFALLS

More specifically we recommend that these actors become sensitized to the true nature of implementation.

- First, effective implementation does not occur automatically. Rather, it is a complex process of program assembly. It requires joint action in order to achieve the full and necessary assemblage.
- Second, major difficulties will almost always characterize the process of policy implementation, especially if the policies are even mildly innovative. Implementation is a process of avoiding pitfalls.

The following sections will detail these two elements.

(III) PROGRAM ASSEMBLY

Program assembly should be viewed as involving the following general elements.

(A) Numerous actors are involved in the program assembly process. (We shall refer to both organizations and individuals as "actors".)

This is true even of programs with relatively straightforward design such as YEDPA. The tables in the introduction which listed the points of decision and clearance necessary for program completion clearly indicated this. A general list of actors for a local YEDPA program includes most of the

following: The local program itself and its staff, the prime sponsor, the larger political entity and its leaders (e.g., the Mayor), the schools, the unions, public sector worksites, private sector worksites, CBO's, and post-program employers. Often DOL and Regional DOL (RDOL) are also relevant actors as well as intermediate bodies like YouthWork, CPPV, MDRC or HUD.

Table 3 gives a specific list of actors involved in one of our nine programs, New Haven's Ventures.

(B) <u>These actors have significant interests which are largely independent of each other and independent of the YEDPA program and/or of the prime sponsor and its larger political entity</u>. Moreover, most of these actors are independent of each other's control even when both are in the public sector.

In Newark, for example, Independence High School (IHS), the prime sponsor (Mayor's Office of Employment and Training) and YouthWork were all strangers to each other in May 1978. By October of 1978, all three organizations knew each other quite well but still held independent agendas: IHS remained an autonomous, alternative school mainly interested in helping disaffected youth. The prime sponsor was mainly interested in avoiding any hint of fraud or misapplication of funds. YouthWork was a private, non-profit organization administering DOL's Exemplary In-School program, mainly interested in seeing all of their projects succeed. All three organizations became involved in negotiations over joint action concerning who would pay for the work experience component (and how much) and income eligibility requirements for participants.

In Albuquerque's THE program, the prime and the schools had worked together before. But the hotels, which were the worksites and the entire focal point of the program, had no prior relationship with either the prime or the schools. The hotels agreed to participate only after some rather hard bargaining between the prime, the schools and the hotels. The schools originally offered each hotel $10,000 for participating in the program. The prime rejected the fee as being far too generous. The schools and the hotels and the prime finally agreed on a figure of $75 a week.

Finally, in Baltimore, representatives of large businesses (The Ramsey Conference) backed the Entitlement program and pledged support and worksites. But at the site, these employers were not quite so cooperative. They wanted to be able to make their own selection of youth employees and generally were not tolerant of behavior problems. They offered less in the way of training at the personal level of supervisor-to-youth than did "ma and pa" stores. Indeed, ultimately the Baltimore program shifted its emphasis in private worksite development to the small business sector.

(IV) SUCCESSFUL PROGRAM ASSEMBLY: A STRONG EXECUTIVE, THE CREATION OF INTEREST CONVERGENCE, AND SECURING IT DOWN TO THE WORKSITE

Successful program assembly should involve the following elements:

(A) The program assembly process will not run by itself. It has to be put together piece by piece. It should be guided by a strong executive, which means: First, the executive should have enough power to operate. Second, he must pursue the following actions: Actors and interests have to be cajoled, convinced, and persuaded into joint action. Adjustments and adaptations have to be made. Coalitions have to be built.

The Syracuse program offers two examples: The selection of an able program operator was key to the program's success. Lt. Jones, the originator of the conception, was the obvious choice. However, Air National Guard regulations prevented this. Jones would not have become the program's executive if the Base commander had not intervened to make adjustments and adaptations.

When Jones had to leave Syracuse because of an Air National Guard transfer, wise selection of a program executive was again required. This time Jones carefully provided for the selection of an able successor. He reviewed the qualifications of many potential candidates and then found one that was not only strong but whom he personally knew. Jones then took steps to aid the transfer of this ANG officer from Tennessee to Syracuse.

In San Antonio, Patlan, the MAUC director, created a coalition behind his program by developing support for it from the Six Parish Coalition (a group previously formed by activist priests to organize barrio residents) and from local construction unions. These parishes aided YCCIP by helping with recruitment of youth, individual homeowners, and institutional clients. MAUC staff were permitted to speak at parish gatherings to explain YCCIP and solicit participation. The church buildings themselves provided MAUC with some of its earliest worksites and also paid for materials. This enabled crews to be put to work rapidly at the program's inception. Indeed, one MAUC criteria for selecting areas within the city to receive YCCIP service was whether it had an active parish. The unions provided supervisors for the YCCIP crews and apprenticeships for program graduates. (The incentives that Patlan in turn was able to offer the parishes and unions will be described in the next section.)

(B) Perhaps the most important strategy for effective program assembly is the creation of a pattern of interest convergence among the relevant actors through the development of complementary incentives.

The program executive first must identify the interests of relevant actors. He should be mindful that they will be most likely to respond positively to the program if they are offered incentives rather than pleas to altruistic motives or authoritative declarations, formal rules, or regulations.

- The executive should distribute incentives that will lead these actors into a pattern of interest convergence: one in which they will find their interests and the interest of the YEDPA program in convergence.
- The use of complementary incentives can help create this. Since different actors and organizations often have divergent interests, incentives to create program assembly must focus on the points at which these various objectives converge.
- In the ideal, there are points at which the achievement of these objectives is highly interlocked: situations in which while achieving one's own objectives, the actor also contributes to achieving the objectives of another actor.

For instance, we found that in the two YCCIP programs and in Portland's EHR, the work-providing agencies could not receive the free labor that they sought to increase their productivity without simultaneously providing the YCCIP

program with worksites. This is a striking convergence, but there were several other instances of similar convergence through complementary incentives.

In New Haven, VICI needed general support from the carpenters and painters unions, specific aid such as providing supervisors for VICI crews and apprenticeships for VICI graduates, and a willingness to hold in abeyance their suspicions of "another CETA program". In turn, in negotiations with the unions, the VICI program executive stressed the following benefits: the union would be getting a pre-apprenticeship program which would reduce their cost of training apprentices, referral service for skilled minorities which would help them satisfy affirmative action requirements, and jobs for unemployed journeymen by hiring them as crew-chiefs. Involvement in the program would be good public relations for the unions (New Haven was the only New England city to receive a VICI grant). Finally, the program would not be taking work away from the unions because the rehab work to be done is ordinarily contracted out to nonunion carpenters and painters.

The referral service for skilled minorities was very attractive to the unions. Most federal jobs have affirmative action requirements, but the unions have experienced difficulty in recruiting minorities on their own. And for one union, having VICI serve as a pre-apprenticeship program was attractive because it did not have an apprenticeship program.

Similarly, VICI in New Haven needed worksites. In turn, in negotiations with work-providing agencies, the program executive stressed that involvement in VICI would give them access to free labor which would increase their productivity. The money saved on labor costs could be used to purchase additional materials and thus allow more work to be done on the individual jobs. Minimizing labor costs was a powerful incentive to these agencies because they are limited in the amount they can spend on each house by federal, state and city guidelines.

In Portland, the Portland Development Commission provided worksites. In turn, it received crews to do work that PDC otherwise would not have been able to do

because of HUD loan restrictions and an inability to find qualified private contractors willing to work for what PDC could pay. The School District provided a director and a building for the program headquarters. In turn, it received a vocational education program at minimal cost. Also, EHR relieved the schools of students that the conventional classroom had difficulty accomodating. Labor provided crew supervisors with technical assistance for training, skills development, and tool maintenance. In return they received a pre-apprenticeship program, a vehicle for work experience in the high school, a referral service for skilled minorities and jobs for their unemployed journeymen.

In San Antonio, in return for providing crew supervisors and apprenticeships for program graduates, unions were offered even broader incentives than in other cities. Unions are not strong in San Antonio and are continually undercut by the cheap, migrant labor pool. In negotiations with the unions, MAUC's Patlan emphasized that the YCCIP program offered unions an opportunity to teach union values (fair wages and work practices) so the youth would not become a part of that pool. Patlan also emphasized that admitting youths to the unions would inhibit the growth of skilled nonunion laborers who could depress union wages. Finally, as an investor in two major (including the Hyatt Hotel) and numerous minor building projects, MAUC assured the unions that these construction sites would use union labor.* In the case of the parishes, in return for the aid which they gave MAUC, the churches themselves received significant physical improvements since they also served as worksites.

(C) Program assembly in a YEDPA program must be secured all the way down to the worksite and through to the process of job placement. Worksite management is a difficult task; it will not occur automatically.

- Securing cooperation from bureaucratic actors and achieving the appropriate recruitments (participants that fit income and minority targets; meaningful worksites; good supervisors) are necessary but not sufficient steps. The program executive must be certain that something is going on at the worksites: the difficult task of teaching specific skill functions must be achieved.

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*In San Antonio, this is a significant pledge because the unions are aware that without MAUC's insistence, contractors probably would lure nonunion labor for these projects.

All the pieces of the program must be put together at the worksite and in the classroom. The activity at the worksite should develop the participants' job skills and should be relevant to future job placements. YEDPA programs perform important screening and certification functions for employers, but even more essential are the specific skill functions.

- The desired activities will not automatically or easily be established at the worksites. Youths participating in YEDPA are not easy to work with or train. They do not come to the program with many job or academic skills and often have not had successful experiences in other skill preparation situations such as school.

All this should not be surprising since it is precisely analogous to the street-level management problems that executives have in other public organizations. "Street-level bureaucrats" are officials at the lower levels of public organizations' hierarchy who are in direct contact with their clients, exercise a great deal of discretion in making nontrivial decisions about applying general rules to particular cases, and often must work with very general, imprecise and ambiguous rules or laws. In effect they create and change policies. But it is difficult for executives to effectively supervise and control these officials, such as police patrolmen, teachers, social workers in welfare work, lower court judges, property tax assessors, and worksite supervisors and teachers in manpower programs.

- Finally, the development of a satisfactory job placement process may be the least automatic part of assembling a YEDPA program and requires significant and constant efforts by the program executive.

There are numerous instances of adjustments and repairs made by program executives in order to secure program assembly down to the worksite and the way this contributed to the effective implementation of these programs. In Pittsburgh, during STAY's first semester, a weak curriculum (class content had been up to individual teachers) and the fact that a majority of STAY participants strongly disliked school, made the two-hour after-school class a disaster with poor attendance. Monaco, the program executive, responded by hiring a full-time curriculum developer to put together a curriculum that would attract and teach students who hated school. He also made class attendance mandatory. The curriculum and attendance improved. Reading scores for over half the participants also improved, though the causal connection and significance of that are debatable.

In Syracuse there were similar improvements in the classroom curriculum. Lt. Butler added an interview with the worksite supervisor as part of the screening and admissions process. The supervisors make the final admission decision which prevents their feeling that a particular participant is being forced on them. This interview also focuses on better tailoring the work to the participant's interests as well as job market conditions.

In New Haven's VICI, program director Connolly responded effectively to placement problems. When the bleak job market for union carpenters and painters resulted in very limited openings in apprenticeship programs, Connolly adjusted and through a good deal of detail work, developed nonunion placements. She and crew supervisors also made important adjustments when faced with problems at the worksites. Initially the crews undertook many small projects to achieve a high productivity rate. But the skills development component suffered. In response to external suggestions from CPPV and complaints from crew supervisors, Connolly shifted the policy to one of bigger worksites. They incorporated a wider variety of skills and a higher ratio of rough work to finish work which also gave participants broader skill experiences.

The need for attention to putting pieces together as far down as the worksite is indicated by the Entitlement program in general and the Baltimore program in particular. The Entitlement program's provisions of a job guarantee and the admission of all eligible youth in an area seem to result in less specific skill training related to particular careers than in the other programs. This is because there seem to be more difficulties in Entitlement in getting the desired type of worksites and sufficient worksite supervision. In Baltimore, for example, we noted the program's worksite difficulties with large employers.

- We now return to the details behind what we called the second major element of the true nature of implementation.

(V) IMPLEMENTATION: A PROCESS OF AVOIDING PITFALLS

(A) We recommend that YEDPA policymakers assume that major difficulties will almost always characterize implementation and that it is a process of avoiding pitfalls.

- They must eschew the view that good ideas will implement themselves or at least face a relatively easy implementation process because they have good designs.
- They cannot assume that someone else will consider the issue of implementation feasibility and that someone else will worry about the specific steps of program assembly.

(B) We specifically recommend that the major strategy for avoiding implementation pitfalls should be steps to anticipate them. If one can anticipate these pitfalls, then one will be better able to develop ways of avoiding them, coping with them, and/or overcoming them.

(C) But how is one to go about anticipating them? The next dozen sections will suggest some ways. They are described roughly in ascending order of importance.

(VI) THE BENEFITS OF PREVIOUS DIRECT OPERATING EXPERIENCE

- YEDPA designers and implementors will be better able to anticipate implementation pitfalls if they have previously had direct operating experience in another YEDPA or manpower or education program.

A corollary: We found that the separation between planning and implementation, which has plagued many federal programs,* can be bridged if the program planner then becomes the program operator.

The prior operating experience of STAY's (Pittsburgh) director, Fred Monaco, seems to have contributed to effective implementation by helping him anticipate implementation difficulties. Before Monaco began STAY, he had six years' experience running the SET/AVERT Programs for the Pittsburgh schools.** He knew what kinds of difficulties kids were having in adjusting to work and designed STAY for the type of youth who was failing to successfully complete the SET/AVERT Program.

Albuquerque's WORP Program began auspiciously when Dennis Contreras was recruited as program planner. He was able to bridge the gap between planning and implementation. He had operating experience as director of YIEP (Youth In-School Employment Program), a work opportunities program for in-school youths. He used procedures that had worked well at YIEP to anticipate potential difficulties. For example, he built into the program a system of documentation to identify participants' and work supervisors' responsibilities and their contacts with WORP counselors. (In San Antonio and Baltimore such clear operating procedures were not part of the initial program design and significant problems occurred which necessitated developing them later.) Contreras then bridged the planning-implementation gap by moving directly from his position as program planner to program coordinator.

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*In the past, the implementation of many programs has been made very difficult because of a separation of policy design and policy implementation. Planning has been done by one organization; the consequences have been felt by another. Design has been done by persons at the federal level; implementation has been carried out at the local level. Design has been done by persons with a planning background who have had no operating experience. Planning has been done by a top executive staff; implementation has been done by persons lower down in the organization's hierarchy.

**SET/AVERT are two similar programs in which in-school youth who are having problems with school are assisted in finding permanent part-time employment.

Similarly, in New Haven's VICI the planning and implementation separation was bridged when one of its original planners, Sally Connolly, became program director. She brought a good deal of experience as youth program administrator and as author of New Haven's Entitlement proposal. In her previous operating experience she had learned that linkages with other organizations and agencies had to be more than proposed linkages. This led her to negotiate them with the unions and work-providing agencies even prior to submitting the grant proposal for VICI.

Equally important in VICI was the prior operating experience of the assistant director, Al Rogers, as Director of the Maintenance Division in the New Haven Housing Authority. In addition to his contacts in the building trades, his perspective from the field as well as from a managerial position was especially helpful with the technical field details over which implementation typically stumbles and is delayed (e.g., the scheduling work for the crews and familiarizing the journeymen with paperwork and supervisory tasks).

The previous experience of Phil Yourish, Newark IHS's program director, helped him implement an innovative program. Yourish previously worked at both traditional and alternative high schools and had some feel for the needs of IHS students. He felt that their needs were better served by an intense concentration on basic reading, writing, and math skills and rejected the prior emphasis of IHS on raising political consciousness.

The importance of previous experience is even more sharply indicated by the area in which Yourish lacked it and the resulting implementation difficulties. In his first years at IHS (and earlier), Yourish had worked in rather insulated and independent school settings in which it was not necessary to deal with other agencies equal to or higher than his school in an administrative hierarchy. This inexperience resulted in difficulties and delays in the joint activity with the prime sponsor for the YETP program.

Similarly the inexperience of the first director of San Antonio's YCCIP program and the consequent implementation difficulties also indicates in a negative way the importance of prior operating experience.

(VII) BUILDING AND MODELING NEW YEDPA PROGRAMS ON PREVIOUSLY SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS

The supply of persons with operating experience obviously is limited, even though recently it has been growing. Also, it is usually more reliable to base policy strategies on institutional, impersonal factors rather than on personal, individualistic ones.

- We thus recommend an additional strategy: building new YEDPA programs on youth programs previously successful in that locality or modeling YEDPA programs on other successful programs so as to avoid continually "reinventing the wheel".

New programs have many advantages, but when a program is new, untried and innovative, it is not possible to anticipate all or even most of the likely implementation difficulties. The experience of several of the nine programs analyzed seems to indicate that building on a prior one or modeling it after one increases the ability to anticipate implementation pitfalls. We found that incrementalism works by contributing to effective implementation.

The first strategy seems to have been crucial in contributing to the effective implementation of the programs in Portland, Pittsburgh, and Newark. For instance, Pittsburgh's STAY was modeled very closely on the school system's previously successful SET/AVERT programs. But it actually went one step further and was built upon these programs, enabling STAY to avoid most of the ordinary implementation difficulties (e.g., the key actors for STAY--the worksites and the schools--were exactly the same ones who had worked together successfully on SET/AVERT for seven years.) The second strategy of modeling on success from elsewhere was used effectively in New Haven and San Antonio.

Previously successful programs tend to be relatively scarce in most fields. But as we have argued, by 1979 the quality of local manpower programs and related personnel has grown greatly. Thus, today there are a significant number of successful programs to serve as seedbeds or models for YEDPA programs. Nevertheless, even to the extent that such programs exist, using them directly or as models may not be appropriate for the particular context at hand: the particular city, demographic mix, or temporal context. For instance, as noted in Baltimore, the use of the BSC administrative model for entitlement was inappropriate and contributed to implementation difficulties.

Also, it is not always desirable to build or model on a prior program. When facing difficult social problems, like youth unemployment, innovative programs often must be created from scratch. Often this will mean developing a program that is quite unlike previous ones. Sometimes it is necessary and desirable to invent a new and different wheel. To some extent the Syracuse program did this by using a military base that was far from the inner city.

(VIII) SCENARIO WRITING: ANOTHER AID IN ANTICIPATING IMPLEMENTATION PITFALLS

- Since it is not always possible or desirable to build or model upon a prior program, we recommend the writing of a scenario as an additional major aid in trying to anticipate implementation difficulties.

Scenario writing involves the imaginative construction of future sequences of actions, the resulting conditions and reactions, and in turn the further conditions and reactions that are developed by all actors and organizations involved in the implementation process.

- At its best scenario writing should sensitize the program executive to the obstacles that lie ahead. It should help him develop one of the most important characteristics of an effective implementor--what Bardach has called a "dirty mind". "The implementor with a 'dirty mind' anticipates and tries to predict implementation difficulties. He is especially attuned to the interests involved and their likelihood of delaying and even resisting the planned implementation route."* A dirty mind would have predicted the ineffective implementation of the swine flu vaccination campaign.**

- Scenario writing brings the likely flaws and problems to the forefront. Thus it forces designers and program executives to try to take account of them. It sensitizes policymakers at the top to the importance of local capacity in carrying out a successful program.

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*Perhaps because of the frequent artificial and inaccurate distinction between policy (politics) and administration (implementation), we are more familiar with a "dirty mind" in policy at the policy adoption stage. For example, a "dirty mind" would have predicted that within a week after Carter's energy speech of Sunday night, July 15, Congress's initial positive response to his proposals would change and then be greeted with more caution and deliberation.

**A dirty mind would have predicted the perfectly common delays, but in this case they were extraordinarily detrimental to the program; the resistance or foot-dragging of almost all the actors including the private vendors (the drug companies), some of the HEW doctors and experts, and some private doctors.

- Thus scenario writing can help the program executive to predict the obstacles that are most likely to arise.

Following this effort at prediction, the executive will be better able to take actions to:

- avoid these obstacles;
- adapt, readjust and cope with them;
- overcome them;
- or some combination of all these things.

In scenario writing, among other things, one must have a keen sense of the political and bureaucratic terrain where the program is taking place. One must be able to "walk through" step-by-step all the functions involved in the programs' continuing operation, all the actions necessary to assemble the required resources, and all the likely intersections with relevant political and bureaucratic actors that will affect the process of setting up and managing the program (Chase). In "walking through" the program one must try to anticipate what is going to happen and especially what will go wrong.*

In writing an implementation scenario one tries to invent plausible stories which may highlight the more obvious flaws of a program. For example, a good deal of delay might have been avoided in Entitlement programs if a scenario had been written concerning its policy of "academic credit for work experience". This has encountered significant opposition from local school officials who insisted that it was their province to decide what merited credit and resented "nonprofessionals" telling them how to run their schools. A reasonable scenario would have anticipated the reluctance (even resistance) of educators in going along with such a policy. Thus it would have forced program executives to try to take account of this obstacle in advance and then try to develop adaptations to deal with it.

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*Compliance features of successful grant proposals to the federal government often contain a "workplan" which details activities, participants and timetables. A scenario would go beyond this and relate the workplan to the real political and bureaucratic conditions that are likely to surround these administrative details, especially the potential obstacles that the workplan is likely to face. Moreover, unlike the "workplan" (which is submitted to DOL), the scenario is entirely an internal document to aid the people running the program.

Scenario writing is an art. Since it requires imagination and intuition, there is not much that can be formalized or codified about how to do it well (Bardach, 1977). This is probably a major reason why scenario writing has not been advocated before and is rarely done by policy analysts and designers. Also, scenario writing is an exercise in concentrated pessimism and creates psychologically difficult processes to undertake and thus usually is shunned.

Scenario writing in effect was approximated in the planning process for New Haven's VICI. Ne Haven's CETA director chose two people with operations backgrounds to write the VICI grant proposal. They developed the proposal by trying to anticipate programmatic problems that could hinder implementation and then tried to set up plans to avoid or overcome them. In this manner they combined planning and implementation in a way that approximated the process of scenario writing and then acted on these predictions. For example, from their previous experience they anticipated the need to have more than proposed linkages. Thus they negotiated them with the unions at the outset.

Unlike almost all of our other recommendations, scenario writing is not primarily extrapolated from our findings among the new programs analyzed. Only the New Haven program made approximate use of it. But our recommendation is based on the findings of the general literature on social policy implementation and recent cases such as the swine flu vaccine program. Moreover, the other programs among the nine analyzed do offer some empirical reinforcement for our scenario writing recommendation. The absence of systematic efforts at anticipating and predicting implementation difficulties resulted in significant implementation problems in many of the nine.

For instance, when one considers that the clientele for Pittsburgh's STAY consists entirely of youths who had severe problems in school, then it should have been anticipated that its two-hour after-school class would meet with student resistance. A reasonable scenario for STAY would have anticipated this resistance and would have initially led to a more structured class at the outset with strong penalties for non-attendance. This, of course, is precisely what happened. But it took a semester's experience before STAY made these changes.

A reasonable scenario for Albuquerque's THE would have anticipated difficulty in convincing high school counselors of the program's benefits. THE felt the program was so good that kids would flock in and did not spend enough time selling it to counselors or school administrators. Thus they had to make a feverish attempt in February of 1978, to get the desired number of youths when a significant short fall in recruiting seemed likely.

For Newark's IHS the central implementation problem was that they did not anticipate (1) that there would be a need for a significant degree of joint action; (2) that joint action would be difficult to achieve given IHS's previous history of autonomy from both the public school system and the city government.

Finally, Baltimore entitlement planners should have anticipated that Public Service Employees would require special training and that they would have more problems than a staff hired from a more marketable pool of applicants. They also should have anticipated that a program of this one's size and complexity required clear operating procedures rather than the inappropriate administrative model of the Baltimore Summer Corps. The major reason that they did not develop these anticipatings and then act on them seems to fit our description above of the political imperatives (such as fast results). They were anxious to begin the program to symbolize the city government's concern about youth unemployment and to satisfy DOL.

(IX) INSTITUTIONALIZING EVALUATION AND REASSESSMENT MECHANISMS

- A "dirty mind" is aware, first, that most implementation difficulties cannot be anticipated fully; second, that a program's implementation cannot even come close to being free of error: the test of a good policy or a good program is not the absence of error, but the ability to detect its own errors and then correct them.

- Thus we recommend that the process of anticipation, prediction, and adaptation be institutionalized beyond scenario writing by building into YEDPA programs mechanisms for feedback, evaluation, and reassessment of the implementation. (There also must be provisions made for the execution of these remedies, which we will discuss in the next section.)

In many of the nine programs, the processes of evaluation and reassessment led to the detection and correction of serious implementation problems. Thus in some of these cases, what was in effect their second phase was effectively implemented, which their initial phase tended not to be. It should be noted that in all these instances of reassessment the processes were informal rather than institutionalized.

For instance in Baltimore, after the first few months of operation, published reports, citizen complaints, and mayoral inquiries made it clear to Pines and Ivry that the program had implementation problems. They also knew that staff was too absorbed in its operation to objectively analyze and evaluate them. Pines and Ivry assembled a task force of top staff from other parts of MOMR. It worked intensively for a month reviewing operations and developing recommendations. Some changes were made immediately; others followed a second reassessment at the conclusion of the program's first summer.* These changes substantially improved program implementation.

MAUC director, Juan Patlan, undertook a similarly successful reassessment and reorganization of San Antonio's YCCIP. Responding to outside criticisms, in the summer of 1978, Patlan instructed Domingo Bueno, head of MAUC's family development department, to investigate the YCCIP and prepare recommendations. Patlan confronted the YCCIP director with the investigation's results and instructed him to comply with its administrative directives (e.g., those needed to stop budget overruns and match worksite assignments with project objectives). Patlan also directed his administrative assistant, Cervantes, to work with and monitor the YCCIP director. The YCCIP director failed to comply with the directives. In September, Patlan created another three-week investigation of YCCIP. With full documentation of poor administration before him, Patlan replaced the YCCIP head with Maggie Eureste, MAUC's youth coordinator. She and her new staff significantly improved the program's implementation.

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*The major problems identified included: 1) the functional separation of operating divisions, 2) unclear operating procedures, 3) inadequate staff quantity and quality, 4) managerial overload, and 5) inequitable caseload allocation. These problems were addressed and largely overcome by: 1) realigning staff along geographic rather than functional lines, 2) developing clear operating procedures, 3) appointing a director whose sole responsibility was entitlement, 4) eliminating CETA public service employees from most direct service positions, 5) adding staff, and 6) reallocating caseloads.

Note that in San Antonio as in Baltimore, the initial feedback mechanism was pressure from outside the program. Internal mechanisms did not alert MAUC's director to YCCIP's problems. It was not until critical HUD evaluators gave the program a very low rating in comparison with others that the director took notice of these problems.

We discussed above how internal and external pressures in New Haven's VICI led the program director to reassess the balance between skills development and job productivity. Ultimately the director decided to shift focus to larger job sites to improve the skills development component which suffered with small worksites. We also discussed some of the problems in Pittsburgh with STAY's two-hour after-school class. They were brought to the director's attention by the Field Service Aides, who successfully recommended that the class be improved in several ways.

As noted in all these cases, the error correction mechanisms were informal rather than institutionalized. The creation of serious and systematic internal evaluations tends not to be in the nature of most public sector organizations. Thus, the institutionalization of these mechanisms probably must be created at an external level such as in the office of the prime sponsor.

(X) THE NEED FOR STRONG PROGRAM EXECUTIVES AND THE PURSUIT OF "FIXER" STRATEGIES

Detecting errors without being able to execute remedies is useless and frustrating. Neither the program assembly nor the subsequent adaptation-compensation responses will run by themselves. They should be guided by a strong executive who has enough power to operate.

- We also recommend that program executives consciously adopt "fixer" strategies.

- A "fixer" is a person who makes repairs and adjustments in the implementation process to make it work. (Bardach, 1977) The "fixer's" adaptations and compensations are designed to protect, correct, and sometimes expand his program, especially through coalitition building and constant intervention in administrative detail.

There is always a need to compensate in the implementation process for omissions made at the design and adoption stages. One can never anticipate fully all the implementation difficulties and counter act resistance activities of other actors. In fact, some omissions were intended because the designer or program executive felt that it was not politically or financially feasible to include them earlier.

Numerous instances of each of these particular elements of the "fixer" strategy were used in the nine cases to achieve effective implementation. In New Haven's Ventures, job placement faced problems because it was aimed at apprenticeship slots requiring a high school diploma (or equivalent) which many participants did not have. When the first planned response--hiring a GED instructor--fell through, program director, Connolly and her original co-planner, Tom Peterson, responded by jumping right in to the details of the program. They taught GED instruction classes at night. (Many other actions in VICI taken by Connolly and assistant director, Rogers which were described above in other sections, would also correspond to several elements of the "fixer" strategy.)

The program director's intervention in administrative detail also seems to have contributed to effective implementation in Syracuse. Program assembly must be secured all the way down to the worksite and no one has a more important role at the worksite than the supervisors. In Syracuse, Lt. Jones personally recruited the supervisors. He went around the base explaining to the guardsmen the objectives of the program, the types of youth involved, and what would be required of them as supervisors. He then selected supervisors on the basis of their desire to participate and their ability to work with minorities and troubled youth.

In Portland, when the transportation line inadvertently was omitted from the budget, the EHR program director took immediate compensating steps. He persuaded the school district to absorb that cost in their own transportation budget. In Albuquerque (WORP) it was necessary to compensate for an intended omission. The initial planners realized that it would be difficult for program participants to use Albuquerque's small public transportation system, but they were reluctant to put an expensive transportation item in the grant lest they lose out to less costly competitors. After they were funded and began operating, counselors found many negative terminations occurring because participants could not get to their jobs on time using public transportation. The program director won approval of a new budget item for a WORP bus by persuading OCETA, the public schools, and MDRC (a private research group that was monitoring Entitlement for DOL).

Baltimore and San Antonio's successful reassessments and reorganizations (described in Section IX) were carried out by executives pursuing the fixer strategy of adaptation. An illustration of successful adaptation and compensation comes from Baltimore. Like other Entitlement programs, MOMR did not fully anticipate its staffing needs. In addition to qualitative problems stemming from its use of PSE's to supervise youths and worksites, YouthWork's staff was too small for such a large and complex program. The contract requirement that 66 percent of its budget be spent on participant wages and benefits also contributed to MOMR's initial staff problems. These problems were dealt with by MOMR negotiating an increased personnel budget to pay for additional staff and upgrade PSE-funded positions. In effect MOMR got MDRC to modify the 66 percent administrative budget limit by awarding "enrichment grants" to meet "program needs not anticipated in the original grant".

The final case which reinforces our recommendation of fixer strategies is a negative one. Yourish's lack of ability or willingness to develop coalition support for IHS frequently caused implementation difficulties. IHS sought to maintain its separateness and autonomy, especially from all public agencies

(such as the public school system and the city government) so much that they also avoided developing a close relationship with the prime sponsor. This led to some of the implementation difficulties noted.

(XI) A PROGRAM EXECUTIVE'S CONTRIBUTIONS AS A "DOUBLE AGENT"

We recommend that prime sponsors seek program executives who can play the role of "double agent".

- Some program executives in the nine cases made major contributions to effective implementation by acting as a "double agent". This role consisted of the ability to secure joint action among various interests in the program assembly process by virtue of the executive's standing and membership in more than one of the relevant camps in the implementation process.

Too often the term linkage is used rather loosely in policy analysis, but the role of double agent seems to give meaning and personification to the idea of linkages. A double agent activates and operationalizes linkages between organizations, agencies and other persons.

- In particular, all these double agents had direct experience with or access to major providers of jobs, most of which were either in the private sector or with a semi-public agency.

For example, in creating and assembling the "THE" program, the hotel industry and the Albuquerque Public Schools had to be brought together. This was largely achieved through the efforts of Betty Lou Snapp. She was a "double agent" who was head of vocational training in the Albuquerque Public Schools, and whose husband was a hotel executive and leader in the local hotel industry.

Lt. Jones conceived of and designed the BOCES-Hancock program and then became its de facto program executive. His positions in several of the relevant camps aided him in creating and then successfully operating the program. He was an officer at the base. He had been active in a broad range of black community affairs and once had worked in the city's Human Rights Department with Lee Best who now works in OFSAC.

As an officer at the base, Jones was aware of its need to augment manpower and utilize resources that were not being used. He was aware that there was a labor shortage at the base which could be ameliorated by bringing these youths there. Many of the base's shops were operating at less than full capacity because their workload exceeded their manpower. The knowledge that double agents Betty Lou Snapp and Norman Watts had of labor shortages in the industries that they were close to also was a major aid to implementation.

Jones also knew of the requirement that New York State's Department of Military and Naval Affairs had that the base become more involved in the communities and with minorities. As head of the base's Social Action Training Program (SATP), a race relations program, Jones had a special interest in a program that would bring minority youth onto the base. Through SATP he knew all the guardsmen and had some insight into their attitudes toward working with minorities, which aided him in the selection of appropriate program supervisors.

Jones' contact with community groups also aided implementation. The director of the Urban League helped draft the proposal. SYMPAC, an organization of minority professionals, provided Jones with job availability information which helped develop marketable worksites. The Urban League also made available their counseling services to program youths.

In the Delaware County (PA) YETP (one of the scores of programs whose outside evaluations were reviewed), Norman Watts' position as a double agent (perhaps even a triple agent) helped him to create and sustain this effectively implemented program. He was both a longtime member of the Delaware County Manpower Board (with a significant interest in youth employment problems) and the personnel administrator of the hospital where the YETP program eventually started. He became a triple agent of sorts when he became the actual operating executive of the YETP program that he helped to found and locate in his hospital.

Watts' firsthand knowledge of the hospital industry, especially its local labor shortage, was a major resource. His position and influence within the hospital enabled him to sell the YETP idea to its staff with relative ease. Selling it to the prime sponsor was also easy because of his manpower board position.

Finally, the crucial assembly step of obtaining the University of New Mexico (UNM) as one of the two worksites for Albuquerque's WORP was achieved through some double-agentry. The key suggestion that WORP seek UNM as a worksite came from a member of the Albuquerque School Board who was familiar with WORP from the public schools perspective. The school board member was also a senior administrator at UNM and knew both of the availability of University resources and its interest in participating in such an image-enhancing project. This double agent arranged a successful meeting between WORP planners and the UNM president.

- In 1979 it does not seem gratuitous to advise prime sponsors to try to find "double agents". The social policy infrastructure and overlapping organizational and personal networks have developed locally so much in the past decade that there seems to have been a significant increase in the supply of talented program executives in general and potential "double agents" in particular.

- Despite this recent increase, potential program executives continue to be relatively scarce because of our limited knowledge of how to increase their supply by exogenous means. The limits this places on strategies built around executives will be discussed shortly.

(XII) PROGRAM EXECUTIVES' TIES TO SOURCES OF JOBS

- Prime sponsors in particular ought to seek program executives who already have ties to sources of jobs.

As noted, all the executives who made contributions as double agents had direct experience with or access to major providers of jobs. One of the several camps in which they had a foot also happened to be a source of jobs.

- There are so many ways that money can be absorbed in a manpower program before one gets to job development that there is a tendency to forget that jobs are essential for its effective implementation.

Developing an effective classroom component for a manpower program is not easy but it is much easier than getting good jobs for youths.

These executives' access to jobs was especially significant because it occurred without the expenditure of program funds. Moreover, most of these jobs were either in the private sector or with a semi-public agency whose budget tended to have some slack in it and were appropriated by bodies quite distant from the program or its city government (e.g., the Air National Guard and the University of New Mexico).

- These program executives' ties preferably should be to private sector jobs.

Private sector jobs are more likely to constrain youths in positive ways because someone there is more likely to care if the youth doesn't show up or does his job poorly. As Arnold Packer has said, "Public sector jobs developed for youth typically tend to be short on providing enough of the discipline needed to hold down a private sector job."

- There is a need to emphasize private sector jobs because they tend to be overlooked. Manpower programs are public sector organizations and are run primarily by persons who have spent most of their careers in the public sector (or academic world). Thus it is understandable that program executives and their superiors are oriented toward public sector job development.

(XIII) EXECUTIVE TALENT IS MORE SCARCE THAN MONEY OR GOOD IDEAS

- Our advice about fixers and double agents, though sound, has limits.
- The fixer strategy is difficult to replicate. Talent is more scarce than either money or good ideas, especially at the executive level. And we have very imperfect knowledge of how to develop such executives.

As Professor James Q. Wilson has argued: "The supply of able, experienced executives is not increasing nearly as fast as the number of problems being addressed by public policy. This deserves emphasis, for it is rarely recognized as a constraint. Anyone who opposed a bold new program on the grounds that there was nobody around able to run it would be accused of being a pettifogger at best and a reactionary do-nothing at worst. Everywhere, except in government, it seems, the scarcity of talent is accepted as a fact of life.... The government--at least publicly--seems to act as if the supply of able political executives were infinitely elastic, though people setting up new agencies will often admit privately that they are so frustrated and appalled by the shortage of talent that the only wonder is why disaster is so long in coming." (Wilson, 1967)

(XIV) THE NEED FOR MODEST AND SIMPLE PROGRAM DESIGN

(A) In light of the scarcity of such persons, we recommend that the design of YEDPA should not rely exclusively on their presence.

- Indeed, the near necessity of talented executives to achieve effective implementation, coupled with their scarcity, leads us to recommend a commensurate modesty in YEDPA program design and in our overall expectations for the programs' effectiveness.

(B) YEDPA program designs should be innovative but realistic in that they:

1) anticipate implementation difficulties;

2) are modest, straightforward, and even simple.

We have already discussed what we mean by this anticipation process.

- Program designs should be modest and simple in that they maintain YEDPA's focus on the goals of job experience, training, job development, and placement.

By keeping to these specific purposes, YEDPA's implementation becomes more manageable and more likely to avoid the implementation pitfalls which have beset other social programs since the mid-1960's. YEDPA programs do not redistribute political power or create political autonomy in low income neighborhoods as the OEO and Model Cities programs sought to. But the nine YEDPA programs we analyzed did achieve the goals upon which YEDPA focused.

- Effective implementation is a function, to a significant degree, of good local administration, but that is not sufficient in itself. Even if and when a local program has a talented program executive, the entire implementation process may founder on a highly complex program design. It might even be said in a figurative sense that for every 1 percent increase in program complexity, it is likely that there will be a 5 percent reduction in implementation effectiveness.

The type of social programs that we reviewed in the Introduction have also had other design problems. Too often they, in effect, have been efforts to feed the horses by feeding the sparrows. The Rube Goldberg nature of these programs' purpose and implementation process have usually been major contributions to ineffective implementation and poor outcomes. Our description (page 9) of the EDA program in Oakland and its circuitous design (subsidizing the capital of business--rather than their wage bill--on the promise that they will later hire low skilled minority persons) is a striking example of this.

- By contrast, YEDPA's designs basically have been rather straightforward. The bulk of YEDPA expenditures has gone for youth wages and benefits. In fact, there is a formal regulation in the YCCIP and YIEPP programs that 65 percent of a program's budget must go directly for youth wages and benefits and it has been rigorously enforced. YEDPA's designs have sought to achieve the specific goals just noted through a relatively straightforward process.

For instance, in three of the nine programs analyzed there were two worksites or less for all the program's participants.* This type of design also facilitated the programs' day to day operation as well as its bureaucratic program assembly. In these programs there was a relatively limited number of discrete functions handled by a relatively limited number of actors (recruitment, job supervision, teaching, counseling, placement). Teaching masonry, for example, is less complex than organizing street gangs. Its results can be more readily seen and evaluated. GED, carpentry, and painting require the mastery of specific techniques that can be measured.

The curriculum at Newark's IHS, especially its changes over time, reflects YEDPA's salutary emphasis on modest and specific program design. IHS attempts to help youth develop work experience and career goals, while at the same time improving basic math, reading, and writing skills. IHS' failure to achieve these goals in its early years while it was raising students' political consciousness prompted IHS, under Yourish's leadership, to change to this more modest and focused approach. However, though modest, IHS is innovative. It is an alternative high school. Unlike the public high schools it has successfully sought to integrate work experience with a student's education. For rotating 9-week periods, half of the student body participate in the academic curriculum and the other half work in public and private sector jobs obtained by IHS. Among other successfully achieved aims, this program shows the students that school and getting a job are interrelated.

(XV) MAINTAINING THE DIVERSITY OF YEDPA'S OVERALL DESIGN AS A NATIONAL PROGRAM

(A) A strength of YEDPA's overall design as a national program seems to be the diversity it encompasses. For example, the nine programs we analyzed include two from YIEPP, two from YCCIP, and five from YETP, with a good deal of diversity among local program designs.

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*In Syracuse there was only one worksite--the Hancock Air National Guard Base; Albuquerque's WORP had two--the Kirtland Air Force Base and the University of New Mexico; in Albuquerque's THE there was only one <u>type</u> of worksite--a full service hotel and there were five of them.

- Indeed, the flexible overall federal design has allowed this diversity to develop rather than mandating it.

- We recommend that DOL continue to allow and encourage this diversity through continuing its flexible approach.

Youth employment is not a single problem with a single cause or a single manifestation. It is a constellation of interrelated problems with complex sources, occurring all across a large and heterogeneous nation. Thus, to maximize effective outcomes and learning, it seems wise to simultaneously allow various policy approaches to it. It is true that this has none of the required systematic variation and controls of a "planned variation" approach. But there still is enough variation among local program designs to give us both broad experience and broad data upon which to base future youth programs.

A specific example of the type of diversity that ought to be allowed and encouraged is the use of military facilities by YEDPA programs as was done in Syracuse and Albuquerque's WORP. These facilities have experience in teaching job skills to youth, including those who had only mixed success in schools. They have sufficient organizational and resource slack to take on the extra duties involved in YEDPA programs. Furthermore, the military facilities we analyzed had a special ability to convey a crucial message about employment and adulthood to low income youth: Subordination in an organization and on a worksite is not a sign of cowardice but often an ordinary characteristic of dignified work. Unfortunately this is not a message that the schools have been good at conveying. But we found that at these two bases the exposure to a military chain-of-command which involved men skilled in their professions (and many times having several stripes on their uniforms) taking orders from (and even saluting) their superiors would bring home this message to these youth.

(B) We do not recommend that diversity be required through the maintenance of three of four separate programs within YEDPA. Rather, programmatic and local diversity should be allowed and encouraged in the specific design of individual programs.

(XVI) SOME FINAL THOUGHTS

YEDPA's purposes are specific and modest, but they are important, even weighty. Attempting to achieve them is a major and laudable task, albeit a difficult one. There is an old Groucho Marx story about two patients in a hospital. It reflects the tokenism of too many public policy programs. One patient says to the other, "The food is awful in this place." And the other replies, "Yes, and the portions are so small."

In urging that YEDPA's program designs maintain their modesty and specificity of focus, we are <u>not</u> merely trying to get bigger portions of awful food. Rather, we aim to fundamentally improve the basic nature of the food; we aim to fundamentally improve youth employment in the United States. Our analysis of these nine YEDPA programs suggests, first, that in principle and in design, a YEDPA program can improve youth employment; second, that these YEDPA Programs can be effectively implemented. We hope our recommendations will be useful in suggesting further improvements for the implementation of YEDPA programs.

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